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Introduction
The constant violation of human rights in Mexico has proven to be the
government's means to remain in power, to threaten the media, and, ironically, to
establish its own National Commission for the Protection of Human Rights. In addition,
the judiciary does not have the power to fully protect the human rights included in the
constitution, and the individuals only have the Amparo suit to seek relief against
violations of their rights. However, the Amparo is an instrument that does not allow
courts to declare null unconstitutional laws or to protect social and political rights.
As a remedy for the violation of human rights in my country, I propose the
creation of a National Court of Human Rights based on a study of the legal systems of
other countries, specifically the United States and Germany. One of the principal aims of
this work will be to scrutinize the legal systems of these countries to establish which legal
characteristics of those systems Mexico may borrow in order to enhance the protection of
Human Rights within its borders.
In Chapter One, I will first compare the human rights that the Constitution of the
United States, the German Basic Law, and the Constitution of Mexico grant to people in
each of these countries. This comparison will be accompanied by a general background
of each of these constitutions to better understand their nature. Once I establish what
kind of guarantees the citizens of these countries have, I will then proceed to analyze how
these rights are protected in each of the countries.
Although the United States and Mexico do not share the same kind of legal
system, the rights protected by the constitutions of these countries are similar. In fact, I
could even go so far as to say that the Mexican constitution is perhaps more precise in the
enumeration of these rights. Moreover, the number of human rights protected by the
Mexican constitution is greater than that of the United States constitution. However, the
protection of these rights is quite different. This difference resides in the power and
prestige that the judicial branch has in the United States.
In Chapter Two, I will study how the Supreme Court of the United States has
secured fundamental rights throughout its history. I will also refer to the important role
that the American institution of judicial review has played in this regard. The use of
judicial review to protect human rights has become of relevant importance not only in
America but in Europe as well. In fact, the protection of human rights by constitutional
review has been the second major justification for the use of this legal instrument in
Europe.
Therefore, while explaining how the German Constitutional Court, or
Bundesverfassungsgerich, protects human rights, I will review the applicability of this
institution by this Court, which possesses a concentrated model of judicial review. This
model, different from the American model of diffuse judicial review, permits that judicial
review be exercised only by specialized courts that have been expressly created to decide
constitutional issues.
Chapter Two also contains a description of the two instruments that deal with the
protection of human rights in the framework of the Mexican constitution: the Amparo
proceeding, and the Comision Nacional de Derechos Humanos (the National Commission
for the Protection of Human Rights). The Amparo suit is the main legal institution to
protect human rights in Mexico, having evolved along with the Mexican judiciary
throughout history.
In Chapter Three, I will compare the German model of concentrated judicial
review with the U.S system of diffuse judicial review, which authorizes all courts to
consider the constitutionality of legislation. This comparison will help to decide what
characteristics are best for the establishment of a Mexican National Court of Human
Rights. In the U.S. legal system, for instance, judicial review has been a main instrument
not only to secure the rights of the people but also to expand the meaning of the rights
granted by the constitution
In the same chapter, within the context of proposing the creation of the National
Court of Human Rights, I will first analyze the most recent reforms to the Mexican
judicial branch to establish the extent to which they help in the protection of human
rights. Then I give some final considerations regarding the weakness of the Amparo trial
concerning the protection of individual guarantees in Mexico. Subsequently, I give the
reasons that support the creation of the National Court of Human rights in Mexico.
Finally, I discuss some general considerations regarding what such a Court could offer.
Chapter I
A. Human Rights in the Constitution of the United States
1. The Bill of Rights
Under the Constitution of the United States, human rights appear principally in
the first ten amendments, the so-called Bill of Rights, and in the Thirteen, Fourteenth and
Fifteen Amendments. Originally the Bill of Rights provided protection for the individual
only against actions of the national government. 1 However, the Fourteenth Amendment,
by the due process clause, expanded the interpretation, and then the debate concerning the
scope of the Bill of Rights established that it protected individuals even against actions of
the states.
2
The first ten amendments comprise what is known as the Bill of Rights. 3 To
discuss these rights in the Constitution of the United States is to mention rights and
freedoms such as the freedom of speech and press, freedom of religion, the right of
1 2 Ralph A. Rossum & G. Alan Tarr, American Constitutional Law, The Bill of Rights and
Subsequent Amendments, 51(1995). See also M. Glenn Abernathy & Barbara A. Perry, Civil
Liberties under the Constitution, 16 (1993). See also C. Herman Pritchett, Constitutional
Civil Liberties, 5 (1984).
2 William B. Lockhart et al, Constitutional Rights and Liberties, cases-comments-questions,
120 (7 Th ed. 1991). See also PRITCHETT, supra note 1, at 13, 14 & 15. See also, GEOFFREY R. STONE ET
al., Constitutional Law, 805 (3 Rd ed. 1996). See also William J. Brannan, Jr, The Bill ofRights and
the States, in THE EVOLVING CONSTITUTION, 254, 254-255 (Norman Dorsen ed., 1989).
Although the process by which the Court has incorporated most of the rights guaranteed in the first eight
amendments applicable to the states is important for this work, I will not discuss this issue in this chapter.
This important point is the subject of Chapter II.
assembly, the right to a jury trial, the right to counsel, the right to confront accusers, the
right to be free from self-incrimination, the protection against double jeopardy, and the
freedom from-cruel and unusual punishments. 4 The Ninth Amendment establishes that
the enumeration of rights in the constitution does not deny people the enjoyment of other
rights retained by them. 5 The Tenth Amendment deals primarily with the rights delegated
to the states rather than individuals rights and thus does not have further relevance to this
work.
These are guarantees enumerated within the first ten Amendments or the Bill of
Rights. However, there are other provisions in the Constitution which affect civil rights.
For example, Article I, section 9 establishes the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus,
which may be suspended only in extraordinary circumstances. 7 Moreover, the third
paragraph of section 9 of Article I states that "no Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law
shall be passed." 8 In addition, section 10 of Article I bans states from passing any bill of
attainder, any ex post facto law, or any law impairing the obligation of contracts.9
The Thirteenth Amendment, section I, forbids slavery and involuntary servitude
"except as a punishment for crime. . ." I0 Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment
3 PRITCHETT, supra note 1 , at 3 & 4.
4 U.S. CONST, amends. I-VIII.
5
U.S. Const, amend. IX "The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to
deny or disparage others retained by the people."
6 U.S. Const, amend. X "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited
by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."
7
U.S. CONST, art. I § 9 "... The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless
when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it."
8
Id.
9
U.S. CONST, art. I § 10 "No States shall. . . pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law
impairing the Obligation of Contracts. . ." See also PRITCHETT, supra note 1, at 5 & 6.
10 U.S. CONST, amend. XIII § 1 "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place
subject to their jurisdiction."
provides that "no state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." 11 The Fifteenth Amendment
guarantees the right to vote to all citizens of the United States no matter what their race,
color, or previous condition of servitude. 12
2. Privileges and Immunities
Article IV, section 2, of the Constitution of the United States contains a Privileges
and Immunities Clause just as the Fourteenth Amendment does in section l. 13 This
double inclusion of what may seem the same clause had a great importance for the history
of constitutional law and for the evolution of the protection of the rights in the United
States.
14 For this reason I will make further comments concerning the meaning of the two
clauses.
11 U.S. CONST, amend. XIV § 1.
12
U.S. Const, amend. XV § 1 "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."
13
U.S. Const, art. I V § 2 reads as follow: "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and
Immunities of Citizens in the Several States."
U.S. Const, amend. XIV § 1 establishes that ". . .No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States. . ."
14 Stone, supra note 2 at 797. See also PRITCHETT, supra note 1, at 10 & 1 1 .(Commenting the important
role of the Fourteenth Amendment to secure the rights guaranteed by the Thirteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments. He also affirms that the basic motivation of Congress to enact the Fourteenth Amendment
was to protect the rights of the "newly freed blacks, to establish constitutional guarantees that would be
effective when, as ultimately would happen, military control was withdrawn from the Southern states.")
See also LOCKHART, supra note 2, at 71. (Pointing out that the sole enactment of the Thirteenth
Amendment to forbid slavery and involuntary servitude did not produce the fruits of freedom due to the
"Black Codes" and other repressive measures) See also Brannan, supra note 2, at 254 & 255.
As early as 1823, in the Corfield v. Coryell case, 15 the Circuit Court for the
District of Pennsylvania handled for the first time a question concerning the meaning and
scope of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, section 2. 16 In the case, a
vessel from Philadelphia was seized by New Jersey authorities after it was found racking
and collecting oysters from the oyster beds in a cove of the Maurice River. 17 The counsel
of the plaintiff objected to the New Jersey act under which the vessel was seized and
which included among its provision a section forbidding the gathering of oysters in any
of the waters of the State to any person who was not an actual inhabitant and resident of
New Jersey. 18 In the objection, the plaintiffs counsel claimed that this section of the
New Jersey act was in contradiction to Article IV, section 2 of the constitution of the
United States by denying to the citizens of other states the rights and privileges enjoyed
by those ofNew Jersey. 19
Justice Bushrod Washington, in delivering the opinion of the court, held as
inadmissible that the proposition of the counsel regarding the application of the Privileges
and Immunities clause to the present case.
20 He remarked the importance of protecting
State's common goods, such as fish, clams and oysters, against a general use which could
exhaust them. 21
15 Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. No. 3230, 546, 546 (1823)
16
Id. at 551.
17
Id. at 546.
18
Id. at 550.
19
Id. at 549.
20
Id. at 552 Justice Washington held that ". . .we cannot accede to the proposition which was insisted on
by the counsel, that, under this provision of the constitution, the citizens of the several states are permitted
to participate in all the rights which belong exclusively to the citizens of any other particular state, merely
upon the ground that they are enjoyed by those citizens. . ."
21
Id. Justice Washington stressed that taking oysters in New Jersey was an exclusive right reserved by the
State to its citizens. Moreover, as it has been shown, this was a matter of property "vested in certain
individuals or in the state." So that, in his opinion "it would be going quite too far to construe the grant of
Corfield is a leading case on the Privileges and Immunities clause of Article IV,
section 2, and its significance is not merely because of the final opinion of the issue in the
case but also because of the definition Justice Washington gave to the clause in
question. 22 He stated that the privileges and immunities under Article IV, section 2, are
rights whose nature is fundamental; "which belong, of right, to the citizens of all free
governments; and which have, at all times, been enjoyed by the citizens of the several
states which compose this Union, from the time of their becoming free, independent and
sovereign."2 He then listed general aspects of those rights which are fundamental by
nature and are "subject nevertheless to such restraints as the government may justly
prescribe for the general good of the whole."24
It is remarkable that Justice Washington never examined the Bill of Rights or any
other precepts in the constitution to establish what the Privileges and Immunities clause
of Article IV, section 2 could mean. 25 He preferred to infer that the clause established a
nation-wide set of standards based on fundamental rights for all states and then to widen
the interpretation of Privileges and Immunities clause of Article IV, section 2. 26 This
position, which was developed and applied during the civil war period, was called the
privileges and immunities of citizens, as amounting to a grant of a cotenancy in the common property of
the state, to the citizens of all the other states. . ."
22 Stone, supra note 2 at 797.
23 Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551 (1823).
24
Id. at 552 Justice Washington mentioned those rights which are fundamental by nature under the
following general heads: "Protection by the government; the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to
acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety. . ."
25 STONE, supra note 2 at 797. See also PRlTCHETT, supra note 1, at 6-7.
26 PRlTCHETT, supra note 1, at 7. See also ROSSUM, supra note 1, at 56 & 96.
"old Republican view" and had great importance in the enactment of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 27
Another interpretation with regard to the Privileges and Immunities clause of
Article IV, section 2 is that the words of this Article do not mean to create a set of rights
for the citizens of the States. 28 Thus, according to the words in Article IV, section 2, it
strictly means that Citizens going from State A to State B should be entitled to the same
rights enjoyed by the those Citizens of State B.29
Fifty years after the decision of Corfield, and four years after the enactment of the
Fourteenth Amendment30
,
the Slaughter-House cases called the attention of the Supreme
Court.
31 The issue in the case was a statute passed by the Louisiana legislature granting
to the Crescent City Live-Stock Landing and Slaughter House Company the exclusive
privilege of operating the slaughter-house business in the New Orleans area. 32 The
company was required by the statute to allow any person to land and slaughter animals in
its facilities at state-regulated prices.
33
27 Pritchett, supra note 1, at 7 & 1 1-12. (Justice Washington's position, "as developed and applied into
the Civil War period, Croskey calls the 'old Republican view' of the privileges and immunities clause a
part of the 'common faith of that party.'") But See also ROSSUM, supra note 1, at 56. (Commenting that
several proponents of the Fourteenth Amendment approvingly noted that, in the Corfield case, Justice
Bushrod Washington had offered a broad interpretation of privileges and immunities as including those
protections which "belong, of right, to the citizens of all free governments.")
28 STONE, supra note 2 at 797. See also PRITCHETT, supra note 1 , at 7.
29
Id.
30
U.S. CONST, amend. XIV (The Fourteenth Amendment was ratified July 9, 1868). See also LOCKHART,
supra note 2 at 71. Authors refer to particular matters concerning the background in which the Fourteenth
Amendment was approved and ratified.
31 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872)
32
Id. at 38 & 39.
33
Id. at 39, 41 & 42. Section Three of the Act deals with the costs for landing steamships at the wharves of
the company; the prices to pay to land animals at the wharves; and the prices for keeping the animals each
and every day at the company's facilities. Section Five makes it the duty of the company to permit any
person to slaughter animals in their slaughter-houses under a heavy penalty for each refusal. Section Seven
of the statute deals with the fees to be paid by "all persons slaughtering or causing to be slaughtered, cattle
or other animals in said slaughter-houses..."
The plaintiffs, in error, argued that among other things, the statute was in
contradiction of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States
because "the States must not weaken nor destroy" the privileges and immunities that
derived from the Fourteenth Amendment of the constitution in behalf "of freemen."34 To
reach this point, they argued that the Privileges or Immunities clause appearing in the
Amendment in question was a tie between the United States and every citizen, and that
said tie was to secure his or her privileges and immunities against any abridgment by
State authority.
35
While delivering the opinion of the Court, Justice Samuel F. Miller stressed the
fact that the Court was called upon for the first time to give construction to the Fourteenth
Amendment, among others. 36 Thus, he started by separating the unique concept included
in the amendment, pointing out that the first section of this amendment clearly
established not only a citizenship of the United States but also a citizenship of the
States.
37
This double citizenship, he said, was found indeed under the first section of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which establishes that "all persons born or naturalized in the
United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof are citizens of the United States and
of the State wherein they reside."38
Justice Miller then took from the context of the amendment the concept that the
sole condition of being a citizen of the United States did not imply citizenship of a
34
Id. at 54.
35
Id. at 53. This argument was strongly related to that of citizenship. The plaintiffs in error understood the
Fourteenth Amendment as giving a sole citizenship protected by the Constitution of the United States and
which could not be infringed by any State disposition.
36
Id. at 67.
37
Id. at 72.
38
Id. at 73.
11
particular State. According to his reading of the amendment it is enough to be born or
naturalized in the United States to be a citizen of the Union, but to be a citizen of a state
involves a further element: residence in that state. 39 In addition, Justice Miller reproduced
the words in the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment to find that it established only
the privileges and immunities of the citizens of the United States but did not speak of
those of citizens of the several states. 40
After this consideration, he asserted that the plaintiffs' argument was incorrect
since it rested on the assumption that the statute abridged the privileges and immunities
of citizens of the United States. 41 Justice Miller reasoned against the plaintiffs' position
giving the following argument:
The language is, 'No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens ofthe United States. ' It
is a little remarkable, if this clause was intended as a protection to the
citizen ofa State against the legislative power of his own State, that the
words citizen of the State should be left out when it is so carefully used,
and used in contradiction to citizens of the United States, in the very
sentence which precedes it. It is too clear for argument that the change
in phraseology was adopted understanding^ and with a purpose 42
Justice Miller finally dismissed the argument of the plaintiffs based on the
Privileges and Immunities clause of the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment on the
grounds that the rights which they invoked were not privileges and immunities of citizens
39
Id. at 74. Justice Miller stated the "not only may a man be a citizen of the United States without being a
citizen of a State, but an important element is necessary to convert the former into the latter. He must reside
within the State to make him a citizen of it, but it is only necessary that he should be born or naturalised in
the United States to be a citizen of the Union."
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id.
12
of the United States but rather privileges and immunities which belonged to citizens of
the States and then left to the States for security and protection.43
The dissenting opinions of this case gave a completely different interpretation of
the Privileges or Immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and a rich set of
considerations regarding its meaning. 44 However, I will not discuss those considerations
because the Court has consistently adhered to Justice Miller's opinion and, in
consequence, it has never invalidated state legislation under the Privileges and
Immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 45
B. Human Rights in the Political Constitution of the Mexican United States
1
. The first Article of the Political Constitution of the Mexican United Stated
The first twenty-nine articles of the Mexican constitution refer expressly to the
human rights of persons in Mexico. 46 Chapter One of the First Title of the constitution
43
Id. at 75, 76, 77, 78 & 79. See also LOCKHART, supra note 2, at 72-76 for comments concerning this
case. See also STONE, supra note 2 at 801-804 for some notes and consideration to the case. See also
Pritchett, supra note 1, at 167 giving some historical background and side effects of this case in other
matters. See also Joseph A. Melusky & Whithman H. Ridgway, The Bill of Rights: Our Written
Legacy, 29-33 (1993). See also Abernathy, supra note 1, at 24 giving some comments regarding the
decision of the case.
44 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 83-130 (1872).
45 LOCKHART, supra note 2, at 75. See also STONE, supra note 2, at 804. See also GERALD GUNTHER,
Constitutional Law, 408 (12 Th ed. 1991).
46 Constitucion de LOS Estados Unidos Mexicanos, chapter one, first title. See also, Lopez Sosa, La
LUCHA POR EL PODER POLITICO EN MEXICO, 115-117 (1994). See also, HECTOR FlX-ZAMUDIO, JUICIO DE
Amparo, 56-57 (1964) See also, Serafin Ortiz-Ramirez, Derecho Constitucional Mexicano, 533-
576 (1961). See also, IGNACIO BURGOA, Las Garantias Individuales, 169-170 (1967). ( Pondering
whether the individual guarantees that the Mexican constitution protects are only included in the first
twenty-nine articles or these individual guarantees extend to other articles of the constitution). See also,
Alfonso Noriega-C, La Naturaleza de las Garantias Individuales en la Constitucion de 1917,
13
embraces these twenty-nine articles and is called De Las Garantias Individuates or
Individual Guaranties. 47 The first Article of this Chapter which is also the first Article in
the constitution establishes that "every person in the Mexican United States shall enjoy
the guarantees granted by this constitution, which cannot be restricted or suspended
except in such cases and under such conditions as are herein provided."48
The content of this article has been the center of innumerable discussions, always
comparing it to the first article of the Mexican Constitution of 1857, which established
that "the Mexican people recognize that the rights of man are the basis and the object of
social institutions. Consequently, they declare that all the laws and all the authorities of
the country must respect and maintain the guarantees which the present constitution
grants."
49
I will not discourse at any length in regard to this point. However, as the Federal
Constitution of 1857 was the principal point of reference for the drafters of the Political
Constitution of the Mexican United States of 1917, it is important to remark the impact
that the Constitution of 1857 had in the construction of what individuals guarantees
would be in the current constitution. The Federal Constitution of 1857, as it is known.
41-50 (1967). (Principally discussing the adoption of the juridical positivist position of the framers of the
1917 constitution while drafting chapter one, first title). See also, FELIPE TENA RAMIREZ, DERECHO
CONSTITUCIONAL MEXICANO, 22 (1968).
47 Constitucion Politica DE LOS Estados Unidos Mexicanos, first title, chapter one.
48 Constitucion Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, first title, chapter one.art. 1
.
49 Constitucion de la Republica Mexicana de 1857, first title, § 1, Art. 1. See also Ignacio Burgoa,
El Juicio de AMPARO, 1 24, 1 29- 1 32 ( 1 977). See also Jose Natividad-Macias, Alcance y Efectividad de las
Garantias Individiales, in ClNCUENTA DlSCURSOS DOCTRINALES EN EL CONGRESO CONSTITUYENTE DE LA
Revolucion Mexicana 1916-1917 53, 57-58 (Gobierno del Estado de Queretaro, Instituto Nacional de
estudios Historicos de la Revolucion Mexicana, Secretaria de Gobernacion ed., 1992) See also ORTIZ-
RAMIREZ, supra note 46, at 529. See also BURGOA, supra note 46, at 149 & 274. See also The ANNALS OF
the American Academy of Political and Social Science, The Mexican Constitution of 1917
COMPARED WITH THE Constitution OF 1857 (Supp. 1917). See also NORIEGA-C, supra note 46, at 20-39.
14
established in its first article the doctrines that gave sense to the protection of human
rights in that constitution. 50
This article set up a hybrid of two doctrines that emerged from the Universal
Declaration of the Rights of Man: Individualism and Liberalism. 51 The first part of the
article expressly introduced these doctrines, which, although they prevailed at the time,
gave a range of primacy to the individual and his rights. 52 It said as follows: "The
Mexican people recognize that the rights of man are the basis and the object of social
institutions
. .
."
5 According to this, Human Rights were the basis of the legal system
and of the State itself. The State was to observe and respect human rights that by nature
belonged to the individual. 54
The second part of this article reads as follow: "Consequently they (the Mexicans)
declare that all the laws and all the authorities of the country must respect and maintain
the guarantees which the present constitution grants."55 As noted here, the constitution
also granted guarantees that were specified in the first twenty-nine articles of the Federal
Constitution of 1857. 56 This article then contained both concepts; first, the rights of man
50 BURGOA, supra note 46, at 129 & 130. See also ORTIZ-RAMIREZ, supra note 46, at 536. See also
BURGOA, supra note 49, at 124, 129, 130 & 131. See also NORIEGA-C, supra note 46, at 19-39. See also
Natividad-Macias, supra note 49, at 57.
51 BURGOA, supra note 46, at 129, 130, 131, 132, & 133. See also ORTIZ-RAMIREZ, supra note 46, at 536.
See also BURGOA, supra note 49, at 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, & 129.
52 BURGOA, supra note 46, at 129. (Giving details about these doctrines). See also ORTIZ-RAMIREZ, supra
note 46, at 536. See also BURGOA, supra note 49, at 123.
53 CONST1TUCION DE LA Republica Mexicana de 1 857, first title, § 1 , Art. 1
.
54 BURGOA, supra note 46, at 131. See also, Natividad-Macias, supra note 49, at 57.
55 CONSTITUCION DE LA REPUBLICA MEXICANA DE 1857, first title, § 1, Art. 1.
56
Id. Section I of the First Title of the Constitution was called "Of the Rights ofMan" and was composed
of twenty nine articles.
15
in the first part of the article and second, the guarantees granted by the constitution in the
second part. 57
The first of them was of dogmatic character with a strong tendency toward the
Doctrine of Naturalism since these rights were ascribed to a natural character and even to
rights given by the Creator. 58 Although the constitution did not detail the rights of man, it
carefully enumerated the guarantees that it granted in its first twenty-nine articles.59
Some of the guarantees were based on the fundamental rights of man. However, other
guarantees did not correspond to the rights-of-man concept, which finds its essence in the
Doctrine of Naturalism. They found a basis in what is called "the rights of the citizen,"
which were part of the Universal Declaration of Rights of Man. In other words, they
57
Id. Article One said:
The Mexican people recognize that the rights of man are the basis and the
object of social institutions. Consequently they declare that all the laws and
all the authorities must respect and maintain the guarantees which the
present constitution grants.
58 BURGOA, supra note 46, at 130. See also, FRANCISCO ZARCO, HISTORIA DEL CONGRESO
CONSTITUYENTE DE 1857 21, (1987) (Ignacio Ramirez, a drafter of the Constitution of 1857, stated that the
rights were not born from the law, that they existed earlier than any law, and that the man was born
possessing them. He remarked that the right to live among others existed by itself and that nobody had
ever thought it was necessary to have a law to allow children and men to feed and live.) See also
Natividad-Macias, supra note 49, at 57. (While amending Article One of the Constitution of 1857,
Natividad-Macias, a drafter of the Constitution of 1917, invoked this article adding the word "natural" to
its wording. He then enunciated Article One as follow: ".. .the 'natural' rights of man are the basis and
the object of social institutions." Although the word "natural" was not in fact inserted in the article, the
concept was in the mind of the men of that time. Natividad-Macias critiqued this article because it
constituted for him a contradiction. The contradiction he found in this provision was that while "the rights
of man" were the basis and abject of social institutions, they could be suspended in given cases according
to Article 29. I think that this contradiction never existed since Article 29 of the constitution of 1857
established that it could "have the power to suspend. . . the guarantees granted by this constitution.'1 ''
However, it never mentioned that it could have the power to suspend "the rights of man," which were
mentioned but not described in the first part of Article One.)
59 CONSTITUCION DE LA R.EPUBLICA MEXICANA DE 1857, first title, § 1, Art. 1. See also BURGOA, supra
note 46, at 130.
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expressed the idea that the individual has pre-determined rights not because he is a human
being but because he is a member of society. 60
In contrast to Article One of the Federal Constitution of 1857, the first article of
the current Mexican Constitution only establishes that all individuals in the Mexican
United States will enjoy the guarantees that membership in society grants. 61 The rights of
man are neither mentioned nor contemplated as "the basis and object of the State."62
Although this particularity has created different interpretations and opinions with regard
to the juridical doctrine adopted by the drafters of the Political Constitution of Mexico,
the fact is that they did confirm them. 63
Thus, for Ignacio Burgoa, a notable Mexican scholar, the change in the wording
of the Article One of the Constitution of 1857 also means a change of doctrine. This
change, he says, constitutes a shift from the Doctrine of Individualism to the Theory of
Rousseau. This theory establishes, in general terms, that the guarantees enjoyed by
60 BURGOA, supra note 46, at 131 & 132. See also ZARCO, supra note 58, at 23 & 24. See also LOPEZ
SOSA, supra note 46, at 115. (Lopez-Sosa comments that human rights are historically contained in the
Universal Declaration of Rights of Man and the Rights of Citizens.)
61 Constitucion Politica DE LOS Estados Unidos Mexicanos, first title, chapter one.art. 1
Every Person in the United Mexican States shall enjoy the guarantees granted
by this Constitution, which cannot be restricted or suspended except in such
cases and under such conditions as are herein provided.
62
Id. See also CONSTITUCION DE LA Republica MexicanA DE 1857, first title, § 1, Art. 1. See also
BURGOA, supra note 46, at 133. See also BURGOA, supra note 49, at 129 & 130. See also THE ANNALS OF
the American Academy of Political and Social Science, The Mexican Constitution of 1917
compared with the Constitution of 1857 (Supp. 1917). See also Ortiz-Ramirez, supra note 46, at
536.
63 LOPEZ SOSA, supra note 46, at 115. But See also BURGOA, supra note 46, at 133. (Burgoa comments
that although the drafters recognised that men as such possess human rights, these rights were guaranteed
by the constitution itself. However, he also comments that the reform to the content of Article one of the
Constitution of 1857 does not constitute a rejection of the "rights of man.") See also BURGOA, supra note
49, at 130 & 131.(Here, Burgoa comments that in the juridical regime instituted in the constitution of 1917
converge different kinds of systems. The liberal-individualist is among them, being this which is found in
several individual guarantees.) See also, Natividad-Macias, supra note 49, at 57. (Natividad-Macias, an
renowned drafter of the present Mexican constitution, stressed that the right to live is a fundamental one
17
people before the public authority are given to them by the society itself, which
constitutes the national sovereignty. So, to conform to this society, people give their
personal rights up and, later, these rights are restored to the individual, but as a
concession granted by the will of the society. This sovereignty is the supreme element of
the nation, above which any power may exist and under which all owe submission. 64
However, during the debates to reform Article One of the Constitution of 1857,
Natividad-Macias, a renowned drafter of the Constitution of 1917, said that the changes
of this article were due to the uncountable problems that it raised in the federal judicial
system, and that it was better to depart from disruptive philosophical postures that only
confused people. 65
Jorge Carpizo, another well known Mexican scholar, states that the reforms to
Article One of the Constitution of 1857 does not constitute any change of theory. The
only difference, he says, is that the current Article One of the Mexican Constitution does
not mention the source of the guarantees. He also comments that although other authors
consider that this reform set up the Doctrine of Positivism in our constitution, he sustains
the belief that the theory included in this article is that which has always been part of the
Mexican constitutionalism: a man has rights for the sole reason that he exists. 66
Thus, despite this polemic interpretation to the meaning of the first article of the
current Mexican constitution, we can assure that human rights are well contemplated in
this body of laws. The reforms to Article One of the Constitution of 1857 were not in
and one that every human being has. He said that this right includes the satisfaction of all the natural
necessities of the individual.)
64 BURGOA, supra note 46, at 133. See also BURGOA, supra note 49, at 130.
65 Natividad-Macias, supra note 49, at 57.
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detriment of the protection of human rights in Mexico. On the contrary, this article has
been seen throughout the history of the Mexican constitutionalism not only as setting
guarantees granted by the constitution, but recognizing also rights to which all human
being are entitled.
2. The Catalogue of Individual Guarantees
The catalogue of Individual Guarantees under the Mexican constitution starts
precisely with the first article of the constitution, to which I have already made reference.
However, it is important to remark that this article sets up the principle of equality in the
constitution, which makes it possible to extend the power of the human rights protection
not only to every Mexican but also to any person in Mexico regardless of his or her
particular condition.67
Under this guarantee of equality, any person in Mexico may invoke the protection
of the guarantees granted by the constitution, no matter his or her color, sex, race, legal
status, particular condition in his/her home-country (ex. slavery), religion, etc. The sole
fact of being within the territory of the Mexican United States makes all persons equal
before the law. 68
66 DICCIONARIO JURIDICO MEXICANO, INSTITUTO DE INVESTIGACIONES JURIDICAS, 1516 & 1517 (6th
ed. 1993) [Hereinafter Diccionario Juridico] See also Lopez Sosa, supra note 46, at 1 15.
67 Ortiz-Ramirez, supra note 46, at 536. See also Burgoa, supra note 46, at 269. See also
CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS, art. 1
.
68 Ortiz-Ramirez, supra note 46, at 536. See also BURGOA, supra note 46, at 269 & 270. See also
CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS, art. 1
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Human rights in the Mexican constitution contemplates both individual and social
guarantees.
69 The classification of them is not a strict one due to the fact that every
guarantee could be placed in any of the different categories. 70 The most common
classification regards the following division: Guarantees of Equality, Guarantees of
Liberty, and Guarantees of Juridical Security. 71 There are other classifications slightly
different from this one, but they do not change the essence of the classification mentioned
above. 72
The Guarantees of Equality are contained in the articles 1, 2, 3, 4, 12 and 13. 73 To
discuss these guarantees is to mention the right which is established for everyone to enjoy
the guarantees granted by the constitution (art. 1); the right to be free from slavery (art.
2); the right to equality under the law regardless of sex (art. 4); the prohibition of titles of
nobility, prerogatives or hereditary honors (art. 12); the prohibition of privileges or
enjoyment emoluments others than those given in compensation for public services and
which are set by law (art. 13); and the prohibition to be judged by privative laws or
special tribunals (art.13).
74
69 DlCClONARJO JUR1DICO, supra note 56, at 1516
70
Id.
71
Id. See also Lopez SOSA, supra note 46, at 1 16.
72 BURGOA, supra note 46, at 269 & 173 & 174. (Burgoa set up the following classification of the
guarantees: Guarantees of Equality, Guarantees of Liberty, Guarantees of Property, and Guarantees of
Judicial Security.) See also ORTIZ-RAMIREZ, supra note 46, at 536. (Ortiz-Ramirez states that the
guarantees are classified as follows: Guarantees of Equality, Guarantees of Liberty, Rights as Guarantees,
Natural and Political Rights guaranteed by Treaties and Covenants, and Guarantees of Judicial Security.)
73 LOPEZ SOSA, supra note 46, at 1 16. See also DlCCIONARIO JURIDICO, supra note 56, at 1516.
74 DlCCIONARIO JURIDICO, supra note 56, at 1517. See also CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LOS ESTADOS
Unidos Mexicanos, first title, chapter one. arts. 1, 2, 3, 4, 12, & 13. See also BURGOA, supra note 46, at
269-303. See also ORTIZ-RAMIREZ, supra note 46, at 534-543.
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The Guarantees of Liberty appear in the articles 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 15, 16, 22,
and 24. 75 They are divided into three categories: liberties of the human person, liberties
of the civic person, and liberties of the social person. 76 The liberties of the human person
may be split in Corporeal Liberties and Abstract Liberties 77 . Corporeal Liberties provide
the liberty to choose freely the number of family members (art. 4); liberty to work (art.5);
freedom from involuntary servitude (art. 5); nullity of contracts, covenants, or agreements
against the human dignity (art. 5); the right to bear arms at home for protection and
legitimate defense (art. 10); freedom of transit (art. 1 1); and abolition of the death penalty
except in the circumstances that the constitution establishes (art. 22). 78 Abstract Liberties
involve the freedom to think (art. 6); the right to information (art. 6); the freedom of
writing and publishing writings (art. 7); freedom of religion (art. 24); and the right of
privacy (art. 16).
79
The Liberties of the Civic Person encompass the right of peacefully presenting
petition to an authority or protest against any act (art.9); and the prohibition against
extraditing political offenders (art. 1 5).
80 The Liberties of the Social Person include the
right to assemble or associate peaceably, but only Mexican citizens may do so to take part
in political affairs of the country (art. 9).
81
75 DICCIONARIO JUR1DIC0, supra note 56, at 1516. See also LOPEZ SOSA, supra note 46, at 116. See also
Constitucion Politica de LOS Estados Unidos Mexicanos, first title, chapter one. arts. 4, 5, 6, 7, 9,
10, 11, 15, 16, 22, &24.
76 DICCIONARIO JURJDICO, supra note 56, at 1517. See also LOPEZ SOSA, supra note 46, at 116.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Id. See also Ortiz-Ramirez, supra note 46, at 544-560. (Although the classification of guarantees that
this author offers is not exactly the same than as what I am considering, the appreciation he has for the
guarantees of liberties are very similar to those that I already mentioned in this work.) See also BURGOA,
supra note 46, at 305-433.
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The Guarantees of Judicial Security are specified in the articles 8, 14, 16, 17, 18,
19, 20, 21, 22, and 23. 82 Article 8 establishes the right of petition and the right to receive
a reply in writing by the authority to whom the petition is addressed. Article 14 prohibits
the retroactive effect of law; establishes the essential formalities of procedure; establishes
the principle of legality; and forbids the imposition of penalties by mere analogy or by
prior evidence in criminal cases. Article 16 sets up the principle of competent authority;
requires a written order issued by a judicial authority, which must state the legal grounds
and the justification to molest any individual in his/her person, family, domicile, papers,
or possessions; requires an order of arrest prior to any detention. Article 1 7 abolishes
imprisonment for debts of a purely civil nature; requires that the administration of justice
be efficient and rapid; and states that none may take the law by his/her own hands.
Article 18 permits arrest only for offenses punishable by imprisonment. Article 19
establishes that any detention may exceed three days without a formal order of
commitment. Article 20 contains the guarantees of the accused in any criminal process.
Article 21 establishes that the prosecution of offenses pertain only to the public minister
and the judicial police. Article 22 prohibits any punishment by mutilation and infamy,
branding, flogging, beating with sticks, torture of any kind, excessive fines, confiscation
of property, and any other unusual or extreme penalties. Article 23 states that criminal
trials may have no more than three instances. 83
82 LOPEZ Sosa, supra note 46, at 1 16 & 1 17. See also DlCClONARJO Juridico, supra note 56, at 1517.
83 LOPEZ SOSA, supra note 46, at 1 16 & 117. See also DICCIONARIO JURIDICO, supra note 56, at 1517 &
1518. See also Constitucion Politica de LOS Estados Unidos Mexicanos, First Title, Chapter One,
arts. 8, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, and 23.
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As mentioned above, the Social Guarantees are the other group of human rights
protected by this constitution. These guarantees appear in the Articles 3, 27, 28, and
123. 84 So, although most of the individual guarantees appear in Chapter One of the First
Title of the constitution, one of the social guarantees appears in Article 123. 85
In contrast to the Individual Guarantees, the Social ones require an action by the
State. Thus, the government has the duty to provide for a minimum standard of education
and economic status for even the poorest social groups of the country. 86 These guarantees
are designed to protect the individual as a member of the society. Thus, Article 3 deals
with education; Article 27 deals with agrarian matters; Article 28 sets up the regulations
for ownership of land; and Article 123 covers labor issues. 87
C. Human Rights in the German Basic Law.
1 . The Origin of the Basic Law
The current German constitution, or Basic Law, poses a set of human rights drawn
upon the experience of former constitutions and upon the devastating aftermath of World
84
. DICCIONARIO JURIDICO, supra note 56, at 1518. See also LOPEZ SOSA, supra note 46, at 1 17.
85 BURGOA, supra note 46, at 170. (Writing about the extension of the individual guarantees in the
constitution, Burgoa questions if we should assume that all the guarantees that the constitution grants are
contained only in Chapter One of the First Title of the Constitution. In response of this, he refers to a
famous Mexican jurist, Ignacio L. Vallarta, who answered this question stating that the concept of
individual guarantees in the constitution was not restrictive. It means, he said, that we should not identify
the term of Individual Guarantees with the first 29 article of the constitution. On the contrary, we should
find individual guarantees in any precept that carries in its essence this concept and complements then
those first twenty-nine Articles.) See also DICCIONARIO JURIDICO, supra note 56, at 1518. See also LOPEZ
SOSA, supra note 46, at 1 1 7.
86 DICCIONARIO JURIDICO, supra note 56, at 1518. See also LOPEZ SOSA, supra note 46, at 117.
87
Id.
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War II. 88 The Frankfurt and Weimar Constitutions, which were antecedent of the Basic
Law {Grundgesetz), did not give a predominant role to human rights in the constitutional
order.
89
Moreover, during World War II, Germany gave a crude lesson of human rights
violations that the rest of the world would not overlook. 90
Once the unconditional surrender of Germany came up on May 8, 1945, the
defeated Germany as well as its capital, Berlin, were divided by the Allies into four zones
of occupation: the northwestern to the United Kingdom, the western to France
,
the
southwestern to the United States, and the eastern to Russia. 91 The de-Nazification, re-
education, and demilitarization of Germany were the principal aims of the Allies, who
agreed at the Yalta conference of 1945 that the "dismemberment" of Germany was
88
Christian Starck, Constitutional Definition and Protection of Rights and Freedoms in, 37 RIGHTS,
Institutions and Impact of International Law according to the German Basic Law 19, 20
(Christian Starck ed., 1987); Eibe H. Riedel, Assertion and Protection ofHuman Rights in International
Treaties and their Impact in the Basic Law, in 37 RIGHTS, INSTITUTIONS AND IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW ACCORDING TO THE GERMAN BASIC Law
,
supra, at 197, 198. See also, Klaus Stern, General
Assessment of the Basic Law - A German View in, 14 GERMAN AND ITS BASIC LAW 17, 29 (Paul Kirchhof
& Donald P. Kommers eds. 1993); Kurt Sontheimer, Principles ofHuman Dignity in the Federal Republic
in, 14 German AND Its Basic Law, supra, at 213, 213 & 214. See also, Georg Ress, The Constitution and
the Requirements ofDemocracy in, 49 NEW CHALLENGES TO THE GERMAN BASIC LAW 111, 115, 1 16, &
117. (Christian Starck ed. 1991). See also, Donald P. Kommers, Basic Rights and Constitutional Review
in, Politics and Government in Germany, 1944-1994 297, 297 & 298 (Carl-Christph Schweitzer et al
eds. 1995). See also, Giinter Diirig, An Introduction to the Basic Law ofthe Federal Republic ofGermany
in, The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany 11, 12& 13; 15& 16 (Ulrich Karpen ed.
1988).
89
Stern, supra note 88, at 29. See also Starck, supra note 88, at 20. (Starck comments that the formulation
of human rights into the current German constitution "drew upon the fundamental rights of the Frankfurter
Reich Constitution of 1849 [which was never put into effect], the Weimar Reich Constitution of 1919 and
the draft of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of the United Nations.") See also ELMAR M.
Hucko, The Democratic Tradition, Four German Constitutions 62-77 (1987). See also Durig,
supra note 88, at 13. (Durig states that in early times, including Weimar, "human rights were only valid
subject to the law; today the laws are only valid subject to the basic rights.")
90 HUCKO, supra note 89, at 62. (Millions of people were killed during World War II. Among them were
over five million Germans and twenty million Russians. Poland lost over twenty percent of its population
and the Jewish population was persecuted and massively killed all over Europe.)
91
Id. See also Jonathan Osmond, German Reunification: A Reference Guide and Comentary at
xiv, (1992). See also Robert Spencer, The Origins of the Federal Republic ofGermany in, POLITICS AND
Government in Germany, supra note 88, at 7 & 8.
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necessary for future peace and security. 92 However, agreements among the Allies would
not work for a long time. France strongly opposed propositions of Great Britain, the
United States, and Russia to treat Germany as a single economic unit with certain
essential administrative departments to deal with communications, trade, finance,
industry, and transportation. 93 In addition, disagreements specially regarding reparations
that Germany was supposed to make "in kind" to cover Allied losses led to a progressive
bitterness over the borders of the occupied zone. 94 Antagonism between the East and the
West culminated on the well-known Cold War between the Soviet Union and the West.
This fact contributed to speeding up both the cooperation between Great Britain and the
United States to release West Germany from being a vanquished and politically
disenfranchised country and led to the establishment of the self-proclaimed German
Democratic Republic in the Soviet Zone on October 7, 1949. 95
The Marshall Plan came about in 1948 to introduce a social market economy
between the American and the British zones, providing the basis on which West Germany
could move towards prosperity and political reconstruction. 96 However, the critical step
in this process would be taken in the London Conference, where the three Western Allies
and the Benelux states moved toward the creation of a West German state by reducing the
existing differences between the defeated and the winners. 97
As a result of this conference, the military governors established the minister-
presidents of the Lander in Frankfurt, who were authorized to draft a constitution and to
92 Spencer, supra note 9 1 , at 1 & 2. See also HuCKO, supra note 89, at 62.
93 Spencer, supra note 91 , at 2.
94
Id.
95
Id. See also HUCKO, supra note 89, at 63.
96 HUCKO, supra note 89, at 64 & 65. See also Spencer, supra note 91, at 4.
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take up the proposals of the London Conference. 98 They then considered that in order to
stress the provisional character of the founding of a West German state, a "Parliamentary
Council" would be elected instead of a constituent assembly, and that the document
drafted by this Council would be called Basic Law rather than a constitution."
The debates were difficult and moved slowly because of the particular character
of the Parliamentary Council and to the presence of the Military Governors and their
interventions, which led to conflicts on many occasions. 100 The final draft of the Basic
Law was adopted by the Parliamentary Council on May 8, 1949, was published in the
Bundesgesetzblatt on May 23, 1949, and entered into force that same day. 101
The Basic Law recognizes its provisional character in Article 146, which was
amended after the peaceful revolution of the German Democratic Republic on November
9, 1989.
102
After its revolution, the East German State called for general elections on
Mach 18, 1990, and the first democratic parliament of East Germany decided on August
23, 1990, to accede to the Federal Republic of Germany, which took place on October 3,
1990. 103
97 HUCKO, supra note 89, at 65. See also Spencer, supra note 91, at 4.
98
Id.
99
Id. See also Ress, supra note 88, at 113.
100 HUCKO, supra note 89, at 67.
101 Spencer, supra note 91 , at 5. See also HUCKO, supra note 89, at 67
102
Ress, supra note 88, at 1 13 & 1 14. See also F.R.G. CONST, art. 146, in The Constitution of the Federal
Republic of Germany 306 (Ulrich Karpen ed. 1988). Art. 146 before amendment: "This Basic Law shall
cease to be in force on the day on which a constitution adopted by a free decision of the German people
comes into force." See also F.R.G. CONST, art. 146 (amended by Unification Treaty of 31 August 1990
and the Federal statute 23 September 1990) in Federal Law Gazette II [Hereinafter F.G.R. CONST.] "This
Basic Law, which is valid for the entire German people following the achievement of the unity and
freedom of Germany, shall cease to be in force on the day on which a constitution adopted by a free
decision of the German people comes into force."
103
Ress, supra note 88, at 114. See also Osmond, supra note 91, at 21-89 for further historical background
of the revolution of East Germany and its final integration to the Federal Republic of Germany.
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2. Legal Influence affecting Human Rights in the Basic Law
It is important to consider the environment that gave birth to the origin of the
Basic Law to understand the principal concerns that the drafters had while enacting it.
However, it is of even of greater importance for this work to signal the legal influence
that the drafters of the Basic Law considered necessary to insert in this body of law in
order to protect individuals. As stated above, Germany faced a terrible international
condemnation for committing a gross violations of human right during World War II.
The founding fathers of the Basic Law were not only aware of this problem, but they also
had to consider that the Nazis had gained power and had ignored constitutional provisions
precisely because of the weakness of the Weimar Constitution of 1919. 104
If the Weimar National Assembly had failed to secure the kind of government that
they did, the Parliamentary Council would not take that risk and, instead, would follow
the Western, democratic constitutional states as models to prevent this problem. 105 The
Parliamentary Council in Germany headed a new appraisal of the individual as a member
of society, and by doing so the framers of the Basic Law, with the acquiescence of the
Allied Western Powers, enacted fundamental principles, being specially attentive to the
protection of the freedom of individual citizens. 106
Moreover, the Parliamentary Council considered that the failure of the Weimar
Constitution was due primarily to two factors: first, the exceedingly mighty position of
the president within the Weimar Constitution; and second, the thoroughly democratic but
104
Ress, supra note 88, at 1 15.
105
Stern, supra note 88, at 18.
106 Riedel, supra note 88, at 198.
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rather formalistic approach of the constitution, which left fundamental rights meaningless
as part of this notion of mere legality . 107
Thus, the Basic Law was embodied with a strong sense of democracy by
weakening the power of the president; by giving a more prevalent role to the Chancellor;
and by making safe the constitutional values against the respective parliamentary
majority. 108 The last point is especially remarkable since human dignity and fundamental
individual rights are among the most important values of the Basic Law. 109
Finally, we should mention that although the Weimar Constitution of 1919 had an
extraordinary chapter of rights, it did not give to them the priority that the Parliamentary
Council gave to these rights in the Basic Law. 110 Moreover, the international
constitutionalist cooperation that Germany received from the Western Allies after World
War II was vital to securing a democratic/bound government respectful of fundamental
rights.
1
" So, although the Parliamentary Council worked out the shaping of the Basic
Law as a purely German affair, we cannot ignore that Western Allies prescribed essential
guidelines that gave life to one of the most reliable legal systems on the world." 2
107
Ress, supra note 88, at 116. ("The President [Reichsprasident] was elected directly by the people, had
the power to appoint and dismiss the chancellor [Reichskanzler], dissolve Parliament and had far-reaching
emergency powers. He could even avoid Parliament and initiate a plebiscite on an act of Parliament."
Moreover "the Constitution of Weimar did not propose any absolute values or ideas. Every possible issue
was at the whim of the majority, if only that majority had been formed correctly.")
108
Id. (Now, the President [Reichsprasident] is not elected directly by the people, is not commander in
Chief, does not appoint the Chancellor, may not dissolve the Parliament, and does not posses emergency
powers. The Chancellor [Reichskanzler] is now elected by the Parliament, enjoys greater powers under the
Basic Law, and is "the political engine in the context of the parliamentary majority.")
109
Id. See also F.R.G. CONST, arts. 1 & 2-19
110 Kommers, supra note 88, at 297.
' '
' Jost Delbriick, Human Rights and International Constitutional Cooperation in, 49 NEW CHALENGES TO
the German Basic Law, supra note 88, at 191, 201 & 202.
112
Id. See also David Ponte, PNUD: la confianza en lajusticia mexicana, de las mas bajas, LA JORNADA,
Octubre, 9, 1997, at 1.
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3. Basic Rights in the Basic Law
The chapter of Basic Rights, which appears at the very beginning of the German
Constitution, is an impressive set of human rights. 113 Section 1 of Article 1 of the
constitution, and of this chapter, sets up the protection and inviolability of human dignity,
whose protection is the duty of all state authority. 114 Section 2 characterizes human rights
as the "basis of the State," the highest and the most predominant principle of the
constitution." 5 Section 3 of this article establishes the direct effect of human right,
binding the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary. 116
Section 1 of Article 2 settles the general right of liberty, which could be divided
into several branches such as freedom of faith and creed, freedom of assembly, and
freedom of expression. 117 This is the right of everybody to freely develop his/her
personality so long as she/he does not "violate the rights of others or offend against the
1,3 Kommers, supra note 88, at 297. See also Ulrich Karpen, Application of the Basic Law in, 23 Main
Principles of the German Basic Law 55, 56 (Christian Starck ed., 1983). See also Sontheimer, supra
note 88, at 213.
,M Kommers, supra note 88, at 297. See also F.R.G. CONST, art. 1
.
1,5
Diirig, supra note 88, at 13. See also Starck, supra note 88, at 22 (Saying that the Basic Law recognizes
fundamental rights which have evolved from natural law origins). See also Ress, supra note 88, at 117
(Reaffirming that Article One possesses one of the main and most important values of the Basic Law. The
others are contained in Articles 2-19 [Human Rights], and in Article 20 [The fundamental organizational
principles of the State and its basic objectives and structure]). See also DONALD P. KOMMERS, JUDICIAL
Politics in West Germany, A Study of the Federal Constitutional Court, 216 (Sage Series on
Politics and the Legal Order, vol. 5, 1976)
116
Ress, supra note 88, at 117. See also Diirig, supra note 88, at 13 (Stressing that two thing are of
particular importance in paragraph 3: first, the character of directly valid law that human rights enjoy; and
second, the binding effect of these rights over the legislature, executive, and judiciary). See also Riedel,
supra note 88, at 200 (Showing the discrepancy existing between "Contractualist" and "Naturalist" when
they interpret the usage of the term "human rights" in the Basic Law. Special reference is giving to the
interpretation of Article 1 and its three paragraphs by these two groups).
" 7
Diirig, supra note 88, at 13. See also KOMMERS, supra note 1 15, at 216 (Quoting from the Basic Law
the limitations to the freedom of expression.).
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constitutional order or the moral code." 118 Section 2 of this article guarantees the right to
life, the inviolability of the person, and the inviolable freedom of the individual." 9
Equality before the law is guaranteed in Article 3, which expressly establishes this
principle in section one. 120 The last two sections describe at some extent the meaning of
this principle: section 2 (Men and women shall have equal rights) and section 3 (No one
may be prejudiced or favored because of sex, parentage, race, language, homeland and
origin, faith, or religion or political opinion). 121
Article 4, sections 1 and 2, secure a classical human right: religious liberty, which
consists of the inviolable freedom of faith, of creed, and of conscience. 122 Rooted in the
liberty of conscience, section 3 of this article gives to the individual the subjective right
of refusing military service in war. 123 Article 5, section 1, guarantees in a broad sense the
freedom of speech, which is another classical human right. 124 This right embraces a
whole arrangement of diverse features of the freedom of speech such as freedom of
information, freedom of the press, freedom of film, and freedom of the broadcasting
118 Kommers, supra note 88, at 298. See also F.R.G. CONST, arts. 2 sec. 1.
119 F.R.G. CONST, arts. 2 sec. 2.
120
F.R.G. CONST, arts. 3 sec. 1.
121 Durig, supra note 88, at 14. See also Volkmar Gotz, Legislative and Executive Power under the
Constitutional Requirements entailed in the Principle of the Rule ofLaw in, 49 NEW CHALLENGES TO THE
German Basic Law, supra note 88, at 141, 155, 156 & 158. See also F.R.G. CONST, art. 3 sec. 1 & 2.
122 Helmut Goerlich, Fundamental Constitutional Rights: Content, Meaning and General Doctrines in, THE
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany, supra note 88, at 45, 47. See also F.R.G.
CONST, art. 4 sec. 1 & 2.
123 Goerlich, supra note 122, at 48. See also Starck, supra note 88, at 20 See also F.R.G. CONST, art. 4
sec. 3.
124 Goerlich, supra note 122, at 47. See also Ress, supra note 88, at 1 19. See also F.R.G. CONST, art. 5,
sec. 1. See also Starck, supra note 88, at 20.(Mentioning the right to unrestricted information from
generally accessible sources, which appears also in section 1 of Article 5). See also Kommers, supra note
88, at 298 (Quoting from Article 5 section 2 in what circumstances the freedom of expression may be
limited).
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media. 125 Section 3 of this article regards art, science, research, and teaching as free;
however, teaching is not released from loyalty to the constitution. 126
Article 6 guarantees "special protection" by the State to the marriage and family,
and the right of the parents to care for their children and direct their upbringing. 127 In
addition, it secures the well-being of children and mothers, and equalizes the rights of
legitimate and illegitimate children. 128 Article 7 discusses education and religion, the
requirements to be fulfilled by private institutions, and the role that the state plays in this
field.
129
Article 8 guarantees one of the rights of the citizens included in the Basic Law:
the right of assembly, 130which "may be restricted by or pursuant to law" in regard to
open-air meetings. 131 Freedom of Association is secured in Article 9, and is considered a
classical human right. 132 This right guarantees freedom to "form trading and limited
companies and company amalgamations (groups, holding companies)." 133 In addition,
Article 9 promotes the right of all German people to associate freely; however, activities
125
Ress, supra note 88, at 120 (Indicating also that Article 5 is "an example of the perception of
fundamental rights as 'institutional guarantees.' Not only must the State refrain from interference
[defensive, subjective character], it must also actively support free press as an institution.")
126 F.R.G. CONST, art.5 sec. 3. See also Kommers, supra note 88, at 298.
127
F.R.G. CONST, art.6 sec. 1 & 2. See also Starck, supra note 88, at 46 & 47 (Setting special
considerations regarding section 2 of Article 6, and public benefits by the state as regulations directly
related to human rights). See also Kommers, , supra note 1 15, at 216.
128 F.R.G. CONST, art. 6 sec. 3, 4, & 5.
129 F.R.G. CONST, art. 7. See also Riedel, supra note 88, at 205. (Indicating that the institutional guarantee
of education facilities is a "fully applicable legal standard that may be tested in the courts.")
130 F.R.G. CONST, art. 8 sec. 1. See also Goerlich, supra note 122, at 47. See also Ress, supra note 88, at
1 19. (Stating that the freedom of assembly is one of the relevant provisions of the Basic law promoting
democracy in Germany.) See also Riedel, supra note 88, at 205.
131 F.R.G. CONST, art. 8 sec. 2.
132 F.R.G. CONST, art. 9. See also Goerlich, supra note 122, at 47. See also Riedel, supra note 88, at 205.
(Talking about the workable character of this right before the courts.) See also Ress, supra note 88, at 119.
(Indicating that the right of association is one of the relevant articles of the German constitution
contributing to democracy in Germany.)
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"directed against the constitutional order or the concept of international understanding are
prohibited." 134
Article 10 holds that the right to "privacy of letters, post, and telecommunications
shall be inviolable." 135 This right may be restricted only pursuant to a statute. 136 Freedom
of Movement is secured by Article 1 1 , which may be restricted only by or pursuant to
law.
137
This right is considered a citizen's right. 138
Article 12 guarantees the rights to choose an occupation and forbids any
compelled activity "except within the framework of a traditional compulsory public
service which applies generally and equally to all." 139 This article contains not only the
right to choose trade or profession freely but also the State's duty to ensure the effective
fulfillment of this right. 140 This right is seen as one of the social and economic rights that
the Basic Law includes. 141 Article 12a covers liability to military and other services. 142
Inviolability of home is a right secured by Article 13, which allows searches only
after an order is issued by a judge, or by other organs as provided by law "in the case of
133
Fritz Ossenbuhl, Economy and Occupational Rights in, 14 German and Its Basic LAW, supra note 88,
at 25 1,252.
134 KOMMERS, supra note 1 15, at 216. See also Kommers, supra note 88, at 298. See also F.R.G. CONST,
art. 9 sec. 2.
135 F.R.G. CONST, art. 10 sec. 1.
136 F.R.G. CONST, art. 10 sec. 2.
137
F.R.G. CONST, art. 1 1 sec. 1 & 2. See also Diirig, supra note 88, at 13. (Stating that most of the aspects
of life are influenced by a special right of freedom expressly mentioned in the Basic Law, and that Article
11, for instance, deals with one of these freedoms. This Article "deals with the freedom of movement
through the federal territory and the right to take up residence in the Federal Republic of Germany.") See
also Ossenbuhl, supra note 133, at 252. (Stating that the freedom contained in Article 1 1 also guarantees
"the free choice of a business location in the Federal Republic")
138 Goerlich, supra note 122, at 47.
139 F.R.G. CONST, art. 12 sec. 1 & 2. See also Starck supra note 88, at 20. See also Riedel, supra note 88,
at 205. See also Ossenbuhl, supra note 133, at 252. (While talking about the constitutional position of the
"freedom of the entrepreneur," he stresses that even though the Basic law does not mention expressly this
right, freedom of trade and freedom of occupation, contained in Article 12, are the main basis of this.)
140 Riedel, supra note 88, at 205.
141 KOMMERS, supra note 1 15, at 215 & 216.
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danger in delay." 143 The right of inviolability of home is considered one of the classical
human rights in the Basic Law. 144 Article 14 guarantees the rights to property and of
inheritance, 145 and is also regarded as a classical one. 146 This article contains also the
right to acquire property and the right to establish a will. 147
The right of German people to enjoy their citizenship is guaranteed by Article 16,
and may be restricted only pursuant to law. 148 The extradition of any German is
forbidden by this article, which also establishes that right of asylum for those persecuted
for political reasons.
149 The Right of Petition, another classical human right, 150 is secured
by Article 17 of the Basic Law. 151
According to Article 1 8, freedoms of expression, the press, assembly, teaching,
and association may be forfeited if they are used "to attack the free democratic basic
order." 152 Article 19 prohibits any interference with the essence of a basic right and
establishes the capacity of individuals to enforce their rights in courts of law. 153 This
capacity of the individuals to enforce their rights opens the doors of the court to this
142 F.R.G. CONST, art. 12a.
143
F.R.G. CONST, art. 13 sec. 1 & 2.
144
Goerlich, supra note 122, at 47.
145
F.R.G. CONST, art. 14.
146 Goerlich, supra note 122, at 47.
147 Otto Kimminich, Property Rights in, 37 RIGHTS, INSTITUTIONS AND IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
ACCORDING TO THE GERMAN BASIC LAW , supra note 88, at 75, 81. (Indicating that German constitutional
theory distinguishes between fundamental rights and institutional rights The fundamental rights are already
mentioned in the text. The institutional guarantees are private property and inheritance.)
148 F.R.G. CONST, art. 16 sec 1.
149 F.R.G. CONST, art. 16 sec 2. See also Starck supra note 88, at 20. See also Goerlich, supra note 122, at
48. (Giving further details concerning the interpretation of this Article.)
150 Goerlich, supra note 122, at 47.
151 F.R.G. CONST, art. 17.
152 F.R.G. CONST, art. 18. See also Kommers, supra note 88, at 298. See also KOMMERS, supra note 1 15,
at 216.
153 F.R.G. CONST, art. 19 sec. 2 & 4. See also Stern, supra note 88, at 30. See also See also Starck supra
note 88, at 20. (Dealing with the binding force of the Basic law and the role of section 2 of Article 19 to
secure "the essential content of the fundamental rights.")
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impressive system of rights, and
,
therefore, section 4 of Article 1 9 has been called "the
culmination of the constitutional state." 154
There are other rights not included in the first chapter of Basic Law in despite of
the fact that their essence makes them fundamental. 155 Among them are "the privileges of
the deputies (Art. 37, 46, 47, 48), the rights of the political parties (Art. 21), the equality
of all Germans (Art. 33), the independence of the courts (Art. 97), the right to be heard in
a properly constituted court, and the banning of retrospective punishment or multiple
convictions for the same crime (Art. 103), protection in case of illegal imprisonment (Art.
104), and the right of religious communities (Art. 140)."
156
154
Diirig, supra note 88, at 14. See also F.R.G. CONST, art. 19 sec. 4.
155 HUCKO, supra note 89, at 70.
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Chapter II
In this chapter, this author will review the existing mechanisms and institutions
devoted to the protection of Constitutional Rights in the United States, Mexico and
Germany. Judicial review of legislative acts is cover at some extent in this chapter,
particularly in the section concerning the legal institutions protecting human right in
Mexico. Judicial review of executive acts was left out of the scope of this paper. In this
chapter, the review of these institutions and mechanisms is more descriptive than critical.
A more critical approach about them is made in the next chapter, specially with regard to
the Mexican judiciary.
A. Mechanisms for the Protection of Individual Rights in the U.S. Legal System
1 . Due Process
In this section, this author will talk about the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause, and limits on state action. However, the same rules generally apply to the Federal
Government via the Fifth Amendment.
157 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteen
157 U.S. Const, amend. V.
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Amendment provides that "no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law. . . ," 158
(a) Liberty and Property Interest
During the early 1970s the Supreme Court decided that many kinds of
government benefits formerly conceived to be simple privileges rather than rights were in
fact interests in liberty or property, which could therefore not be taken without procedural
due process. The major case launching the modern procedural due process was Goldberg
v. Kelly.™
In Goldberg, the Court decided that a welfare recipient's interest in continued
receipt of welfare benefits was a "statutory entitlement" that amounted to property within
the meaning of the due process clause. The Court decided that a welfare recipient must
be given an evidentiary hearing before his benefits may be terminated. In this context,
welfare payments were not mere kindness, but were a right protected by the Constitution
against arbitrary withdrawal. 160
At first it was difficult to determine where this road might lead, but now it appears
that the Court engages in a two-steps analysis. First, the question initially is whether
there is any "liberty" or "property" implicated that justified a triggering of procedural due
158 U.S. CONST, amend. XIV.
159 GUNTHER, supra note 45, at 584-585. See also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
160
Id. See also STONE, supra note 2 at 145.
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process; and second, the question of what process is due, which is commonly reached
only if the first step bears a positive response. 161
Board ofRegents v. Roth 162 as well as most major cases that follow involve public
employees issues because they constructed most of the doctrinal modernization in the
denotation of "liberty" and "property" and because they symbolize the recent "Court's
methodology in a single functional context." 163 In this case, Roth, hired for a one-year
contract at Wisconsin State University-Oshkosh, was informed without explanation that
he would not be rehired for the following year. 164
In Roth, the Court reaffirmed that the "wooden distinction" between "rights" and
"privileges" has fully and finally been rejected as parameters governing the applicability
of procedural due process. 165 The Court also stressed that the requirements of procedural
due process apply only to the deprivation of interests encompassed by the Fourteenth
Amendment's protection of liberty and property. 166 The Court did not find a property
interest on the part of the plaintiff because a person claiming a property interest must
have more than an unilateral expectation of it. He or she must have a legitimate claim of
entitlement to it. 167
The Court held that whether or not such a legitimate entitlement to the property
interest existed was to be defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an
161 GUNTHER, supra note 45, at 585.
162 Board ofRegents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972)
163 GUNTHER, supra note 45, at 585.
164 Stone, supra note 2 at 1049. (Roth was employed for a one year term as assistant professor at
Wisconsin State University. Under state law, he did not have tenure. The president of the university
informed Roth that he would not be rehired; no explanation was given for the decision, and there was no
opportunity to challenge it. Roth alleged that the failure to hold a hearing violated the due process clause.
The Court rejected Roth's claim )
165 Stone, supra note 2 at 1049.
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independent source such as state law. 168 In this case, the rationale of the Court also
emphasized that to determinate whether due process requirements apply in the first place,
it was not necessary to look to the weight , but to the nature of the interest at stake. 169
However, Perry v. Sindermann,™ a companion case to Roth, brought about a
contrasting Supreme Court decision. Sindermann was a professor at Odesa Junior
College whose contract, like Roth's, was not renewed. Sindermann demanded that Odesa
had in fact a tenure program. The College had established in a faculty guide that,
notwithstanding the lack of an existent tenure system, it "wishes each faculty member to
feel that he has permanent tenure so long as his teaching services are satisfactory and as
long as he displays a cooperative attitude." 171
The Court held that Sindermann 's allegations raised a genuine issue because his
interest in continued employment at Odesa Junior College, though not secured by a
formal contract, was secured by a no less biding understanding fostered by the college
administration. 172 The plaintiff was entitled to a full trial court on the alleged
infringement of his First Amendment right. 173
Bishop v. Wood]14 apparently established the possibility that when granting a
benefit, government is free to conditioning an employee's removal on compliance with
certain specified procedures, which at the same time do not allow that property interest
166 GUNTHER, supra note 45, at 586.
167
Id. at 587. See also STONE, supra note 2 at 1050
168
Id.
169 Stone, supra note 2 at 1049.
170 Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
171 Stone, supra note 2 at 1050-1051.
172
Id.
173 GUNTHER, supra note 45, at 587.
174 Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976).
38
arises. In this case, the City Manager of Marion, North Carolina, ended the petitioner's
employment as a policemen without providing him a hearing to learn the sufficiency of
the cause of his discharge. Petitioner brought suit, contending that since he was classified
as "permanent employee" he had a constitutional right to a pre-termination hearing.
During pretrial discovery, he was informed that he had been discharged for
insubordination, "causing low morale," and "conduct unsuited to an officer." 176
While examining the state-law issue, the Court dismissed the plaintiffs property
claim, arguing that according to the U.S. District Court's interpretation of a city
ordinance, the petitioner had held his position "at the will and pleasure of the city." 177
The city ordinance provides that a permanent employee may be dismissed if he fails to
perform work up the standards of his classification, or if he is negligent, inefficient, or
unfit to perform his duties. 178
The Court held that according to the District Court ruling, under applicable North
Carolina precedents, the ordinance did not constituted an expectation of continued public
employment, and that the ruling of this court did not interpret the ordinance as creating
such an expectation. 179
The plaintiff also argued that this dismissal violated his interest in liberty since
the reason given for the discharge were so serious that they stigmatized his reputation,
and those reasons also were false. 180 However, the Court rejected these allegations on the
grounds that such reasons were never stated publicly until after the lawsuit started, and
' 75 GUNTHER, supra note 45, at 590.
176
Id.
177
Id. at 591.
178
Id. at 590.
179
Id. at 590-591.
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that a "contrary holding would enable every discharged employee to assert a
constitutional claim merely by alleging that his former supervisor made a mistake." 181
By comparing the Perry v. Sidermann decision and the Bishop case, it seems that
the sources of constitutionally-protected "property" interests were considerable narrowed.
While in Perry v. Siderman the Court held that an unwritten understanding to secure a de
facto tenure might be binding, in Bishop the Court decided that only a statute or contract
could be enough to originate a Fourteenth Amendment interest.
If Bishop then narrowed the protected "property" interest, Paul v. Davisxn did so
with the definition of the constitutionally-protected "liberty" interest. 183 Davis had been
arrested on a shoplifting charge, petitioner police officials circulated a "flyer" to local
merchants of the area designating him an "active shoplifter." When the shoplifting
charges were dismissed, Davis sued the local police under a federal civil rights law,
claiming that the action had deprived him of his constitutional interest in reputation. 184
At least two important features may be distinguished from Paul and Davis. First,
the Court dismissed Davis' claim, arguing that the "words "liberty" and "property" as
used in the Fourteenth Amendment do not in terms single out reputation as a candidate
for special protection over and above other interest that may be protected by state law." 185
Second, the majority view in Paul seems to have been motivated largely by institutional
concerns, including the fear of excessive Court interference in the administration of state
180
Id. at 590.
m
Id. at 591.
182 Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
183 GUNTHER, supra note 45, at 594. See also Stone, supra note 2 at 1057.
184
Id.
185 GUNTHER, supra note 45, at 595.
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programs and the fear of allowing the Constitution to absorb state tort law, making it
enforceable in the federal courts. 186
However, this narrower definition of "liberty" and "property" has not taken place
in all contexts. For instance, in the school environment
,
the Court has rendered
surprising readings to these terms. 187 In Goss v. Lopez, the Court afforded an informal
hearing to high school students threatened with brief disciplinary suspension. 188
The Court found a property interest because state law established that students
may be suspended only for misconduct. In the Court's appraisal, this provision
constituted a lawful claims of entitlement to a public education. 189 Having created the
public school system, the state had created an entitlement that it could not terminate
without due process. 190
The point of convergence of this subchapter has been on the question of fixing the
limits of constitutionally protected "liberty" and "property" for procedural due process
purposes. However, once the Court bring to an end that a constitutionally defended
"liberty" and "property" interest has been impaired, the issue is to establish what process
is due. 191
In Mathews v. Eldridge,m the Court settled the approach that has become the
predominant one for deciding what process is due. 193 Eldridge had perceived disability
benefits since 1968. After considering Eldridge's reply to a set of questions about his
186
Id. at 596-597. See also STONE, supra note 2 at 1057.
187 GUNTHER, supra note 45, at 598.
188
Id.
189 Stone, supra note 2 at 1057
190 GUNTHER, supra note 45, at 598.
191
Id. at 599.
192 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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condition, reports from Eldridge's physician and a psychiatric consultant, and Eldridge's
files, the pertinent state agency made a tentative determination that Eldridge's disability
had ceased. Eldridge was so informed, given a statement of reasons, and offered an
opportunity to offer a written replication. He did so, confronting the agency's decision,
but benefits were nevertheless finished. Eldridge then claimed that this procedure
violated the Due Process Clause. 194
In holding that disability benefits could be terminated without a prior evidentiary
hearing, the Court reached agreement on a general balancing formula governing the
identification of the procedural guarantees appropriate to a particular circumstance. 195
Said formula or test is sometimes called one of balancing or "cost-benefit" analysis, and
requires consideration of three distinct factors. 196 "First, the private interest that will be
affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the
function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirement would entitle." 197
193 GUNTHER, supra note 45, at 599.
194 Stone, supra note 2 at 1059.
195
Id.
196 Stone, supra note 2 at 1064.
197 GUNTHER, supra note 45, at 599-600. See also STONE, supra note 2 at 1064-1065.
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(b) The Due Process Revolution
The most rapid expansion of the meaning of due process took place in the decade
of 1960's. The Supreme Court, led by Chief Justice Warren, emphatically applied the
guarantees of the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eight Amendment against state action. 198
In Elkins v. United States,™9 the Court forbade federal agents to use evidence
seized illegally by state agents. 200 In this case, the Court finally repudiated the "silver
platter" doctrine, which consisted on that Federal Agents could utilize evidence obtained
by state agents through unreasonable search and seizure, if that evidence was seized
without federal cooperation and was turned over to the federal officials. 201
In 1961, the Court demanded the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence from
state trials in Mapp v. Ohio? ' In this case, suspecting that a criminal was hiding in a
house, Cleveland police broke in the door and searched the whole place without a
warrant. A storage space containing obscene materials was found there and the resident
was then tried and convicted for possession of obscene materials. 203 The Court held that
allowing use of illegally obtained evidence tended to destroy the whole system of
constitutional restraints on which the liberties of the people rest. 204
Two years later, in Gideon v. Wainwright,205 the Court held that all persons
accused with serious crimes in state court were assured the assistance of an attorney, who
198 Witt supra note 159, at 383.
199 Elkins v United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
200 WlTT supra note 159; at 3g3
201
Id. at 538-539.
202
Id. at 384. See also Gunther, supra note 45, at 422. See also Mapp v. Ohio, 2>61 U.S. 643(1961).
203 WITT supra note 159, at 539.
204
Id.
205 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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would be appointed by the court and paid by the state, if necessary. 206 Gideon was an
indigent, tried and convicted in a Florida state court of a felony. He requested and was
denied a court appointed attorney. The judge based his refusal on the fact that Gideon's
crime was not a capital one. Gideon asked a federal court to declare his five-year
sentence invalid because it was obtained in violation of his constitutional right of
counsel.
207
Finally, the Supreme Court consented to hear Gideon's case and held that the
assistance of counsel was so fundamental that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause expanded the Sixth Amendment protection to state defendants. 208 The Court
stated that any person held into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured
a impartial trial unless counsel is afforded to him. 209
In Malloy v. Hogan,2]0 the Court held in 1964 that state suspects, like federal
suspects, are protected against being forced to incriminate themselves. 211 Few
constitutional guarantees have arisen as much controversy as the Fifth Amendment right
not to be forced to incriminate oneself. One important feature of this guarantee is the
right to remain silent when accused, and to refuse to testify in one's own defense. 212
In 1965, the Court decided that due process demanded from the states to afford a
defendant with the right to confront and cross-examine persons who testified against
205 Witt supra note 159, at 384.
207
Id. at 561.
208
Id. See also GUNTHER, supra note 45, at 420-422.
209
Id.
2,0 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
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' Witt supra note 1 59, at 384. See also GUNTHER, supra note 45, at 422. See also LOCKHART, supra
note 2, at 134.
212 WITT supra note 159, at 339
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him. 213 Pointer v. Texas2U involved a trial in which a state prosecutor tried to utilize the
reproduction of a witness's testimony seized at a preliminary hearing, where he was not
subject to cross-examination. The prosecutor had made no effort to secure the personal
appearance of the witness at trial and the Court threw out that evidence. 215
In 1967, in Klopfer v. North Carolina™ the Court held that the Due Process
Clause required protection of the petitioner to speedy trial against abridgment by the
states.
217
In this case the Court struck down a North Carolina statute that permitted
limitless inactivity of a criminal prosecution without dismissal of the indictment. The
defendant would enjoy liberty, but the prosecutor could reinstate the case any time judge
agreed such action to be apropos.
218
The Court held that this procedure "clearly denies the petitioner the right to
speedy trial which we hold is guaranteed to him by the Sixth Amendment We hold
here that the right to a speedy trial is as fundamental as any of the rights secured by the
Sixth Amendment."219
The next year, in Duncan v. Louisiana,220 the Court held that the commitment of
the Nation to the right of jury trial in serious criminal cases as a shielding against
213
Id. at 384. See also GUNTHER, supra note 45, at 422. See also LOCKHART, supra note 2, at 127.
2.4 Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
2.5 Witt supra note 1 59, at 53 1
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capricious law enforcement qualifies for protection under Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause, and "must therefore be respected by the states."221
The test applied for the Court to determine whether a right extended by the Fifth
and Sixth Amendments with respect to federal criminal proceedings is also protected
against state action by the Fourteenth Amendment consists mostly on three questions.
First, "whether a right is among those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which
lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions." Second, "whether it is basic in
our system ofjurisprudence." And third, "whether it is a fundamental right, essential to a
fair trial."
222
Providing an accused with the right to be tried by a jury in criminal cases, the
Court noted, is necessary to prevent oppression by the government. Jury trial not only
protects the defendant against the "corrupt or overzealous prosecutor," but it also guards
him against "the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge."223
Finally, in 1969, the Court applied the ban on double jeopardy to state criminal
proceedings in Benton v. Maryland 224 In its last decision under Chief justice Earl
Warren, the Court in this case decided that the double jeopardy clause applied to the
states through the due process guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment.
225
Prior to the 1960s there were frequent proposals that, even if a particular
guarantee of the Bill of Rights was incorporated in the Due Process clause of the
221 GUNTHER, supra note 45, at 126. See also STONE, supra note 2 at 810-81 1 . See also WITT supra note
1 59, at 530. See also LOCKHART, supra note 2, at 127.
222 STONE, supra note 2 at 81 1 . See also GUNTHER, supra note 45, at 422.
223 LOCKHART, supra note 2, at 126.
224 WITT supra note 159, at 384. See also Benton v. Maryland, 395U.S. 784 (1969). See also STONE,
supra note 2 at 81 1-812.
225 WITT supra note 1 59, at 566.
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Fourteenth Amendment, it did not indispensably add-on to the states in the identical form
as it did to the federal government.226 However, by the 1960s, the Court was determined
to apply the guarantees of the Bill of Rights that were selectively incorporated in the Due
Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the states precisely in the same form as
they applied to the federal government.227
2. The Obligatory or Discretionary Power of the Supreme Court
The appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is so large that this Court has
been allowed to judge as to whether it would receive an appeal, basing its decision on the
importance of the involved question. As a result, the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court is both mandatory and discretionary, being the latter the most significant
in the number of cases reviewed. 229
In deciding whether to receive a case for review, the Supreme Court has
significant discretion
,
subject only to the controls dictated by the Constitution and
Congress. 230 Original jurisdiction means the right of the Supreme Court to hear a case
before any other court does. Appellate jurisdiction is the right to review the decision of
226 Stone, supra note 2 at 8 1 2.
227
Id.
228 Allan R. Brewer-Carias, Judicial Review in Comparative Law, 140 (1 st ed. 1989). See also
Joan Biskupic & Elder Witt, The Supreme Court at Work, 71 (2nd ed. 1997). (hereinafter Biskupic
& Witt)
229 Brewer-Carias, supra note 228, at 140.
230 Biskupic & Witt, supra note 228, at 71 . (Quoting Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution, which
states "In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers, and Consuls, and those in which a State
shall be Party, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction. In all other Cases . . . the Supreme Court
shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, which such Exceptions, and under such
Regulations as the Congress shall make." See also U.S. CONST, art. Ill § 2. See also BREWER-CARIAS,
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lower courts. 231 Commonly, only a handful of original jurisdiction cases are filed each
term because the great majority of cases reaching the Supreme Court are appeals from
rulings of the lower courts. 232
Due to the limited and less important nature of the original jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court, it is clear that the most meaningful activity of the Supreme Court is
carried out through its appellate jurisdiction in which it works as the court of last resort. 233
In this regard, especially in the field of constitutional issues, the Supreme Court emerges
as the most significant tribunal in the American system with a great appellate jurisdiction
arranged by Congress to guarantee a final, authoritative, and uniform interpretation of the
Constitution and of the laws and treaties of the United States. 234
The main reform with respect to the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
was taken by the 1925 Judiciary Act. 235 After the enactment of said Act, the Supreme
Court had broad discretion to determine for itself what cases it would hear. Since
Congress in 1988 practically removed the Court's compulsory jurisdiction through which
it was obliged to hear most appeals, that discretion has been nearly limitless. 236
supra note 228, at 1 39. See also David M. O'Brien, Storm Center, The Supreme Court in American
Politics
,
207 (3 rd ed. 1993)
231 Biskupic & Witt, supra note 228, at 7 1
.
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This discretionary power to decide the cases to be heard by the Court has
modified the character of the Supreme Court as a furthest appellate tribunal or an
ordinary judicial body. 237 The Supreme Court has become a "Court of Special Resort for
the settlement only of such questions as it deems to involve a substantial public concern,
rather than the concerns only of private persons as such."238
(a) Certiorari and Appeals
The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, for constitutional purposes, is placed in
Article III. However, Congress has never given litigants right of entry to the Court in all
cases for which Article III furnish permission. The commanding provisions are
established in 28 U.S.C. §§ 125 1-1257.
23
' These provisions authorized two main
methods to reach the Supreme Court. The first, cast aside in 1988 except for rare cases, is
through an appeal; the second is through certiorari}A0
The mandatory jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is the appellate jurisdiction,
which is exercised when the right of appeal is granted to a party to bring a case before
this Court.
241
In the relatively few cases to come to the Supreme Court by means of
appeal, the appellant must file a jurisdictional statement justifying why his or her case
qualifies for review and why the Court should confer it a hearing. 242 Obligatory or
237 Brewer-Carias, supra note 228, at 141.
238
Id.
239 Stone, supra note 2 at 145
240
Id. See also BlSKUPlC & WlTT, supra note22S, at 71. See also BREWER-CARIAS, supra note 228, at 141.
241 BREWER-CARIAS, supra note 228, at 141. See also STONE, supra note 2 at 145.
242 BlSKUPlC & WITT, supra note 228, at 7
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mandatory appellate jurisdiction is restricted to the following cases, all related to
constitutional justice:
Cases in which a federal court of appeal has held a state statute to be null and
void as antagonistic to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States. 243
Cases in which a federal court of appeal has held a state statute to be
unconstitutional, so long as the federal government is a party. 244
Cases in which a State Supreme Court has drawn into dispute the validity of a
treaty or statute of the United States [Act of Congress] and the judgment is
against its cogency. 245
Cases judged by special three-judge federal district courts, bearing in main
that this kind of court must be established through the expansion of the federal
district court where ordinarily only one judge sits to attend the case, when a
proceeding is brought into to enjoin either a federal or state statute on the
basis of its constitutionality. 246
Cases in which a State Supreme Court has drawn into consideration the
validity of a statute of any state on the grounds of its being contrary to the
Constitution, treaties or law of the United States, and the decision is in favor
of its validity. 247
243 BREWER-CARIAS, supra note 228, at 141 . See also ROBERT L. STERN ET AL, SUPREME COURT
Practice, 403 (6™ ed. 1986). See also 28 U.S. Code, 1254, 2.
244 BREWER-CARIAS, supra note 228, at 141. See also STERN, supra note 243, at 402. See also 28 U.S.
Code, 1252.
245 BREWER-CARIAS, supra note 228, at 141 . See also STERN, supra note 243, at 403. See also 28 U.S.
Code, 1257,2.
246 BREWER-CARIAS, supra note 228, at 14. See also 28 U.S. Code, 1253, 2281, 2282, 2284.
247 BREWER-CARIAS, supra note 228, at 141 . See also STERN, supra note 243, at 403. See also 28 U.S.
Code, 1257,2.
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This right to appeal and the mandatory appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court is confined to important constitutional problems. 248 In all other cases the Supreme
Court is allowed to examine all the decisions of the federal courts of appeals, of the
specialized federal courts, and all the decisions of the State Supreme Courts concerning
questions of federal law. This jurisdiction is a discretionary one when the applicant is for
a petition for a writ of certiorari. 249
The principal difference between the certiorari and the appeal methods is that the
Supreme Court enjoys total discretion to grant a request for a writ of certiorari, but is
under an obligation to receive and decide a case that arrives to it on appeal. 250 Cases in
which there is no an established right of appeal and where the mandatory appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is not set up can reach this Court as petitions for
certiorari.
25]
In petitioning for a writ of certiorari, a litigant who has lost a case in the lower
court sets out the reasons why the Supreme Court should review his or her case. 25. This
method of seeking review by the Supreme Court is expressly established in the following
cases:
248 BREWER-CARIAS, supra note 228, at 141.
249
Id.
250 BISKUPIC & WITT, supra note 228, at 7 1 . BREWER-CARJAS, supra note 228, at 142.
251 BREWER-CARJAS, supra note 228, at 142.
252 BISKUPIC & WITT, supra note 228, at 7 1
.
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Cases decided by the federal court of appeals, granted upon the petition of any
party to any civil or criminal case, before or after rendition of judgment or
decree. 253
Cases decided in the Court of Claims granted on petition of the United States
or the claimant. 254
Cases decided in the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. 255
Cases decided by the Supreme Court of the states where the validity of a treaty
or statute of the United States is drawn into question or where the validity of a
state statute is drawn into question of its being repugnant to the Constitution,
treaties or laws of the United States, or where any title, right, privilege or
immunity is specially set up or claimed under he Constitution, Treaties or
statutes of, or commission held or authority exercised under the United
States.
256
According to the Supreme Court's Rule No. 17, in all these cases when referring
to the considerations governing review on certiorari ... "a review on writ of certiorari is
not a matter of right, but of judicial discretion, and will be granted only when there are
special and important reasons therefor."257 The same Rule 17 arranges the certiorari
considerations into a list of three basic factors that might prompt the Supreme Court to
253 Brewer-Carias, supra note 228, at 142. See also 28 U.S. Code, 1254, 1.
254 BREWER-CARJAS, supra note 228, at 142. See also 28 U.S. Code, 1255, 1.
255 BREWER-CARIAS, supra note 228, at 142. See also 28 U.S. Code, 1256.
256 BREWER-CARIAS, supra note 228, at 142. See also 28 U.S. Code, 1257, 3.
257 BREWER-CARIAS, supra note 228, at 142. See also STERN, supra note 243, at 195
52
grant certiorari even though without controlling nor fully measuring the Court's
discretion, as follows:
1. When afederal court ofappeals has rendered a decision in conflict
with the decision of another federal court of appeals on the same matter; or
has decided a federal question in a way in conflict with a State court of last
resort; or has so far departedfrom the accepted and usual curse ofjudicial
proceedings or has far sanctioned such a departure by a lower court, as to
callfor an exercise of this Court 's power ofsupervision;
2. When a State court oflast resort has decided afederal question in a
way in conflict with the decision of another State court of last resort or a
federal court ofappeal;
3. When a State court or a federal court of appeals has decided an
important question offederal law which has not been , but should be, settled
by this Court, or has decided a federal question in a way in conflict with
applicable decisions ofthis court.
2
'58
However, any enumeration of factors that may trigger the review of a given case
by the Supreme Court can be temeritous because the justices can also change their minds
once the writ has been granted, disposing of the writ by dismissing it as "improvidently
granted/' 2 They do so when developments concerning the legal affectation of a case
occur after certiorari is granted, or when briefs or oral argument make the case look quite
different from the way it appeared in the more limited certiorari petition. 260
The use of "improvidently granted" or DIG "escape" has provoked criticisms to
the discretionary power of the Supreme Court. For instance, when the Supreme Court,
immediately after Brown v. Board ofEducation^ after hearing oral argument in a case
258 Stern, supra note 243, at 403. See also Brewer-Carias, supra note 228, at 142. See also LEE
Epstein et al., The Supreme Court Compendium; Data, Decisions & Developments, 53 (1994). See
also STONE, supra note 2 at 145. See also BlSKUPlC & Witt, supra note 228, at 72. See also STHEPHEN L.
Wasby, The Supreme Court in the Federal Judicial System, 158 (1987).
259 WASBY , supra note 258, at 159
260
Id. at 159
261 Brown v. Board ofEducation, 347 U.S. 483.
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involving discrimination by a cemetery association, dividing evenly, and receiving a
request for rehearing, dismissed certiorari to evade deciding this case. 262
By practice, certiorari is conferred by a vote of at least four justices, the "rule of
four" that is also applicable to decisions to "note probable jurisdiction" in appeals. 263 The
"rule of four is a rule developed by the Supreme Court to guide the exercise of its
discretionary power. 264 A fundamental feature of this rule is that once this rule has been
fulfilled, the justices who objected to review, if they compose a five-judge majority,
should not go around and discard the case, and all should take part in deciding it on the
merits.
265
In short, certiorari is granted by the Supreme Court in order to promote
uniformity and consistency in federal law. Special factors such as those mentioned above
may prompt the granting of certiorari by the this Court; however, review may be granted
on the basis of other factors, or denied even in the event that one or more of the already
mentioned circumstances are present. 266 The discretion of the Supreme Court is not
restricted, and it is the significance of the problem and the public interest noticed by the
Court in a particular case, which leads the Supreme Court to grant certiorari and to
review some cases. 267
262 Wasby
,
supra note 258, at 159.
263
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264
Id. See also BlSKUPIC & WITT, supra note 228, at 72.
265 Wasby
,
supra note 258, at 159. (This rule brings about some problems, for instance, when considering
that the Federal Employer Liability Act (FELA) cases should not have been granted certiorari, Justice
Frankfurter refused to participate in deciding them. "Had all justices followed his practice, the "rule of
four" would be the "rule of five.")
266 Brewer-Carias, supra note 228, at 142.
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3. The Role of the District Courts and the Courts of Appeals in Protecting Constitutional
Rights
(a) District Courts
Hierarchically, the federal courts enjoy a three-tiered system: trial or courts of first
instance, inferior or intermediate courts of appeals, and a Supreme Court. 268 The federal
district courts decide the greater part of cases received in the federal system. 269 These
courts are precisely the primary trial courts of general jurisdiction for the federal
system.
270
The jurisdiction of these courts stretches out to many types of conflicts: "civil and
criminal cases arising out of the laws of the United States; controversies between citizens
of different states; cases in which the United States is a plaintiff or defendant; habeas
corpus proceedings; and cases rising out of federal civil rights litigation originating from
violations by state officers of the constitutional rights of the plaintiff seeking damages or
other relief."
271
The federal district courts try the vast majority of cases heard in the federal
system and most district court decisions are final. 272 These courts are the only federal
ones in which attorneys examine and cross-examine witness. Subsequent appeals of the
trial court will focus on correcting errors but the factual record is established at this level.
268 SEGAL, supra note 236, at 166. See also O'BRIEN, supra note 230, at 209. See also Brewer-Carias,
supra note 228, at 138.
269 Segal, supra note 236, at 166.. .
270 Epstein, supra note 258, at 63 1 -633. See also Brewer-Carias, supra note 228, at 138. See also
Wasby
,
supra note 258, at 33.
271 Brewer-Carias, supra note 228, at 138. See also Wasby , supra note 258, at 33-34.
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Determining facts is a task that often falls to a jury, which consists of citizens from the
society who serve as fair arbitrators of the facts and apply the law to the facts. 273
The conclusive character of district court decisions is due to the fact that they are
either not appealed, or if appealed, are settled prior to an appellate ruling, or, in the vast
proportion of cases reviewed by the courts of appeals, they are sustained. 274 In addition,
the fact that by no means all courts of appeals rulings are carried to the Supreme Court,
which grant review to only a very small percentage of those cases seeking review,275
makes final the great majority of district court decisions. 276
Furthermore, appellate court review of district courts decisions is not uniform
across the districts within each circuit or across subject matters; indeed court of appeals
furnish "sustained supervision" of district court judgments "in only a few areas of public
policy."2 In part because district courts rulings on different subjects are appealed in
differing proportions, appellate review is not necessarily focused so as to bring about
uniformity on questions of federal law or protection of meaningful federal interests. 278
272 SEGAL, supra note 236, at 166.. See also WASBY , supra note 258, at 34
273 Robert A. Carp & Ronald Stidhmam, Judicial Process in America, 42 ( 1989)
274 Wasby
,
supra note 258, at 34.
275 BlSKUPIC & WITT, supra note 228, at 74. (Commenting that "the reduction of cases granted review and
resulting in sogned opinions was dramatic into the 1990s: in October 1986 term the Court issued 145
opinions; in 1987, it issuedl39; in 1988, it issued 133; in 1989, it issued 129; in 1990, 1 12; in 1991, 107; in
1992, 107; in 1993, 84; in 1994, 82; in 1995, 75.")
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(b) The Courts of Appeals
Over the district courts are the United States courts of appeals, which are the
general appellate courts for the federal judicial system. 279 These courts do not have
original jurisdiction and are rigorously appellate tribunals, with very comprehensive
jurisdiction derived from the fact that all decisions of the district courts may be appealed
to them. 280
In 1891, the United States court of appeals were established in their current form
as a consequence of increased federal court case load and the recognition of the
impracticality of having Supreme Court justices sit on circuit. 281 The creation of these
courts began the tendency of furnishing the Supreme Court with the capability to decide
which cases it would review. 282
The court of appeals handle cases on all types of federal law and bring some
degree of uniformity to national law, providing some oversight of activities once
considered primarily local. 283 Each of the twelve regular courts of appeals has
jurisdiction over a specific geographical region known as circuit, and appeals are
commonly heard by panels of three appellate judges. 284
279
Id. Brewer-Carias, supra note 228, at 138.
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supra note 236, at 167. See also EPSTEIN, supra note 258, at 632.
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Id. at 42 ("There are now twelve U.S. Courts of Appeals - eleven numbered circuits and one for the
District of Columbia - with general appellate jurisdiction, in addition to the specialized Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit and a Temporary National Emergency Court of Appeals. Except for the District of
Columbia Circuit, each court of appeals covers several states.") See also EPSTEIN, supra note 258, at 632.
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Cases in the courts of appeals differ extensively in their complexity. Certain
appeals are thought to be "frivolous," having little meaning and not raising new issues.
Many other are routine, and still other appeals are "ritualistic," brought because of the
litigants' demands even when the likelihood of reversal of the district court decision is
low. 285
Only a small number of cases include "nonconsensual" appeals "which raise
major questions of public policy and upon which there is considerable disagreement."286
Among the nonconsensual appeals may be those in which "issue transformation" has
taken place in the court of appeals. Among those would be instances in which civil
liberties problems were not an significant piece of the case at trial but became pivotal in
the appeal.
287
The Court of appeals must hear all cases brought to them. 288 Bearing in mind this
fact, and the fact that very few cases are appealed to the Supreme Court, which rejects
most certiorari petitions, the finality of decisions by these court is of particular
importance. 289 For instance, in the Second, Fifth, and District of Columbia Circuits, only
one out of five decisions was appealed, with the Supreme Court granting review to only
one-tenth of those-leaving ninety eight percent of appeals court rulings as the final
judicial statement. 290
Due to the fact that most of the rulings of the United States courts of appeals are
not disturbed, these courts "make national law," although "residual and regionally," and
285 WASBY
,
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the Supreme Court stands largely dependent on them to "enforce the supremacy and
uniformity of national law," specially in those domains of law in which undisturbed cases
have a tendency to cluster. 291
However, the courts of appeals do not comprise a single institution for the
creation of national policy. 29 ' Thus, the enforcement of "the supremacy and uniformity of
national law" by courts of appeals is performed by twelve different courts that are marked
by broad variety in their business and behavior. 293
The interests and the values held by the members of appellate courts vary within a
court and among diverse courts, and variances of orientation without doubt elucidate in
part the divergent decisions reached in resembling cases by the appellate courts of
different circuits.
294
Although the courts of appeals are referred to as if they were a single policy-
making body, the appellate court do acquire identifying personalities. 295 A major
difference in policy making by the Supreme Court and by the courts of appeals is that the
courts of appeals are more likely to make policy on a regional basis. 296 This regional
diversity has leaded to think that "regionalization of appellate structures, for some
subjects at last, may well spawn regional specialization and regionalized national law."297
When policy making is defined through the use of doctrinal analysis, it has been
found that in the absence of clear Supreme Court standards, the courts of appeals played a
290 WASBY
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292 John B. Gates & Charles A. Johnson, The American Courts, A critical Assessment, 52 (1991)
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main role in the growth of desegregation policy outside the South. 298 The majority of pro-
desegregation standards were embraced by a group of circuits including two from the
East and two which include states from South and Midwest. 299 The less strict standards
were adopted by the Far West's Ninth Circuit and the Midwestern Seventh. There were
no certain patterns in the Third or the Tenth. 300
Variances of interests and values within a court and among diverse appellate
courts indeed produce divergent outcomes in resembling cases. For example, some
decades ago, the Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, characterized those ideas connected to
Southern democracy, particularly the areas of conventional opposition to organized
labor.
301
Fifth Circuit's dispositions showed a strong bias against restraints dictated by a
distant national government, specially against efforts of the National Labor Relation
Board to interfere with free relations between management and workers. 302
This problem has not escaped from the Supreme Court's attention, which in 1971
appointed a study group to determine what recommendations should be made to meet the
increasing difficulties in giving adequate attention to each appeal. 303 In the so called
Freud Report, the study group found that there was lacking uniformity of holdings on
federal law because of disparate decisions made by the various circuits courts. 304
297 GATES, supra note 292, at 52.
298
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300
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301 EARLY supra note 294, at 129.
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Id. (Commenting also that "through the 1930s this particular appellate court demonstrated an anti-New
Deal, conservative economic and political philosophy of localism, individualism, governmental self
restraint, and states' rights. Itseffective leader, Chief Judge Hutcheson, refused to follow the lead of the
High Court when it implied a move to curb state power over licensing and censoring of motion pictures.")
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According to the results of the Freud Report, it was statistically demonstrated that
the Supreme Court was unable to perform its function of unifying federal law and of
resolving many important cases involving constitutional questions because of mounting
cases in all federal courts resulting in appeals. 305
One year later, in 1 972, Congress created a Commission on the Revision of the
Federal Court Appellate System. The commission found again that the real needs of the
country for definitive adjudication of national issues were not being met, and that many
important cases were not given plenary review by the Court due to the reduced number of
cases it accepts for review. 306
Both the Freud study group and the Commission on the Revision of the Federal
Court Appellate System made several different recommendations to resolve this problem;
however, both coincided in one suggestion. They proposed the creation of a National
Court of Appeals "to assure that a social security claimant, a taxpayer, or a defendant in a
criminal prosecution in Georgia is treated no differently than one in Oregon solely
because of an accident in geography."307 None of this studies' recommendations finally
succeeded. 308
Thus, in practice, the enforcement of "the supremacy and uniformity of national
law" is still performed by the courts of appeals, which in the majority of the cases are
more likely to make policy in the regional basis. 309 Although they are regarded as a
305
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single policy-making body, policy-making is in fact performed by twelve different courts
that are marked by broad variety in their decisions in resembling cases. 310
B. Mechanisms Protecting Constitutional Rights in the Mexican Legal System
At the present time, there are two instruments that deal with the protection of
Human Rights in the Mexican legal system according to the Constitution: the Amparo
trial, and the Comision Nacional de Derechos Humanos (The National Commission for
the Protection of Human Rights). 311 I will briefly review both of them in the
chronological order they were inserted in the Mexican constitution.
1 . Role of the Federal Courts and the Amparo Trial
The Amparo suit was originally created in 1840 by Manuel Cresencio Rejon to be
inserted in the Yucatan State Constitution. 312 This institution was first introduced in the
Mexican federal constitution in 1847 and was mainly proposed to protect individual
310 Gates, supra note 292, at 52-
311 Constitucion Politica DE LOS Estados Unidos Mexicanos, Third Title, Chapter Fourth, art. 103, §
I, & art. 107. (With regard to the Amparo proceeding, Article 103, § 1 establishes that the Federal Tribunals
shall resolve any controversy arising from laws or acts of the authority violating individual guarantees.
Article 107 states that any controversy mentioned in Article 103 shall be subjected to the basis of the
Amparo proceeding.)
3,2 Richard D. Baker, Judicial Review in Mexico, A study of the Amparo suit, 22 (1971). See also
Fix-ZAMUDIO, supra note 46, at 373. See also BURGOA, supra note 49, at 115. See also Pedro Pablo
Camargo, The Claim of "Amaparo" in Mexico: Constitutional Protection of Human Rights, in
Comparative Constitutional Law, Mexico-Uganda-United Sates, Cases-Articles-Comments-
Questions, 415 (Fletcher N. Baldwin, Jr. ed., 1974).
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guarantees.
313
This instrument obtained its status as a constitutional institution by a
proposal of Mariano Otero, who actively participated in the shaping of the Adas de
Reformas of 1847, the name of this constitution. 314 Although the Rejon's concept of
Amparo had much more reaching legal scope, the so-called Mariano Otero Formula was
adopted to characterize the scope and limits of this suit. 315 Since the Otero Formula still
characterizes the functioning of the Amparo, I will quote it in full:
The tribunals of the Federation will protect (ampardn) any inhabitant of the
Republic in the exercise of the rights granted to him by this Constitution and
the constitutional laws, against any attack of the Legislative and Executive
Powers, whether of the Federation or of the States, limiting themselves to
affording protection in the special case to which the complaint refers, without
making any general declaration as to the law or act on which the compliant is
based}^
The Amparo was definitively established in Articles 101 and 102 of the Federal
Constitution of 1857. 317 But the consolidation of the Amparo needed to wait until the
French intervention and the civil war were over. Thus, it was not until 1867 that this
institution was used as a remedy similar to that of the habeas corpus against illegal
arrests.
318
Later on, the Supreme Court used it to protect the due process of law clause
included in Article 14 of the constitution, which is meant to be almost a replica of the
313 Fix-ZAMUDIO, supra note 46, at 373 & 374. See also BURGOA, supra note 49, at 121. See also BAKER
supra note 3 1 2, at 22. See also, Camargo, supra note 3 1 2, at 4 1 3
.
3,4 BAKER supra note 3 1 2, at 22. See also Camargo, supra note 3 1 2, at 4 1 6. See also Fix-ZAMUDIO, supra
note 46, at 373. See also BURGOA, supra note 49, at 121-122.
315 Baker supra note 312, at 22. (Briefly noted, Rejdn's intention for this institution was to confer to the
Supreme Court the Power to exercise a general and inclusive power of constitutional defense, covering the
organic sections as well as the bill of rights.) See also BURGOA, supra note 49, at 115. (Citing Juan
Francisco Molina Soli's, a prestigious historian, Burgoa points out that the Rejon' s concept of Amparo was
more extensive and ample than the Amparo finally inserted in the Mexican constitution of 1857.)
316 Baker supra note 312, at 23. Camargo, supra note 312, at 416. See also, Fix-ZAMUDIO, supra note 46,
at 373. See also BURGOA, supra note 49, at 1 2 1
.
317 Fix-ZAMUDIO, supra note 46, at 374. See also BURGOA, supra note 49, at 126, 127. See also Camargo,
supra note 3 1 2, at 4 1 5. See also BAKER supra note 3 1 2, at 36.
318 Camargo, supra note 3 1 2, at 4 1 6. See also Baker supra note 3 1 2, at 22.
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Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. 319 It was then that the Amparo
became a system of control of legality and constitutionality by protecting not only the
rights directly conferred by the constitution but also other rights established in secondary
regulations.
320
The current Mexican constitution, which was promulgated in 1917, expressly
recognizes the ample affects of the control of legality, achieved by the Supreme Court
through the Amparo}21 The Constitution of 1917 displays the essential basis for this suit
in its Articles 103 and 107. 32 ' The Amparo has experimented a vertiginous growth that
has led it to fulfill numerous constitutional vacuums. The Amparo has satisfied needs as
an extraordinary recourse of legality, as a recourse of cassation, as a writ of habeas
corpus, as an indirect means ofjudicial review, and as an administrative jurisdiction. 323
This vertiginous growth of the Amparo has made it a broad and a complex
structure,
324
which I will review only in general terms. Mexican scholars have mainly
319 Camargo, supra note 312, at 416. See also Emilio Rabasa, El Articulo 14 Y El Juicio
CONSTITUCIONAL, 3-9 (3rd ed. 1969).
320 Fix-ZAMUDIO, supra note 46, at 374. (Noting that the "arbitrary" interpretation that the Supreme Court
gave to Article 14 of the Federal Constitution of 1857 give birth to the principle of garantia de la exacta
aplicacion de la ley [control of legality]. This principle of control of legality was mainly applied against
resolutions of any judge in the country). See also Camargo, supra note 312, at 416. See also BURGOA,
supra note 49, at 149.
321 Camargo, supra note 312, at 416, 417.
322
Id. at 417.
323 Camargo, supra note 312, at 416. See also BAKER supra note 312, at 27. (Stating that this impressive
growth of the Amparo has led Mexican publicists to try to discover its origin. Many of them consider that
this institution relies on both the American common law and the European civil and common law
traditions. The Amparo received European influence mostly from Spain. The Spain institutions commonly
cited as precedent of the Amparo are the cuatro procesos forales and the court of Justicia Mayor. These
institutions are of greater interest for an analysis ofjudicial controls, "although the rights they defended can
hardly be considered constitutional in the modern sense." According to the author, the main source of
Amparo must be found in the American institution of judicial review "transmitted to the Mexicans
through Tocqueville's Democracy in America" ).
324 Camargo, supra note 3 12, at 41 8.
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divided this extensive institution into five aspects. 325 First, the Amparo of Liberty is
principally concerned with the protection of any person whose life, liberty, or integrity is
threatened by an act of an authority. 326 This branch of the Amparo fulfils similar
functions to the American Writ of Habeas Corpus, and consists of an exceptional, flexible
and quick procedure, different from the procedures prescribed to protect other individual
guarantees.
This procedure can be submitted by the interested or by a third person, who may
even be under-age, before a district judge, an ordinary judge, or any other judicial
authority at any hour of the day or of the night. 328 Whether or not the judge is a district
judge, he has the power to order the immediate suspension of the authority's activity that
violates the individual guarantees, but he must send the proceedings to the district judge
in order to start the trial formally.
329
Second, the Amparo Against Laws tends to protect the supremacy of the Federal
Constitution by invalidating, in the specific case, the legislative act pointed at as contrary
to the constitution.
330
This kind ofAmparo controls two forms of constitutional review of
the laws: "the action, and the recourse of unconstitutionality of Laws."™ The action
offers to the petitioner the opportunity to impugn ordinary legislative dispositions when
325
Id.
326 DICCIONARIO JURIDICO, supra note 56, at 158.
327
Id. See also Camargo, supra note 3 1 2, at 4 1 8. Fix-ZAMUDIO, supra note 46, at 377.
328 DICCIONARIO JURIDICO, supra note 56, at 158. See also Camargo, supra note 312, at 419. See also Fix-
ZAMUDIO, supra note 46, at 378.
329DlCCI0NAR10 JURIDICO, supra note 56, at 158. See also Camargo, supra note 312, at 419. See also FlX-
ZAMUDIO, supra note 46, at 378.
330DICCIONARIO JURIDICO, supra note 56, at 158. See also Camargo, supra note 312, at 420. See also FlX-
ZAMUDIO, supra note 46, at 378.
331 Fix-ZAMUDIO, supra note 46, at 378. See also Camargo, supra note 3 12, at 420.
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he is affected in his basic rights, and such laws are contrary to the constitution. 332 The
impugnment must be presented before a District Judge.333
The petitioner in this action may be a person directly or indirectly damaged by the
first application of a legal disposition or by the authority applying that regulation.334
Therefore, the parties of this action are the petitioner, the body which has passed the law,
and/or the administrative authority which exercises or tries to exercise the law in a
particular case.
335
The recourse of unconstitutionality of laws allows the petitioner to apply this
recourse in form of direct Amparo against sentences of ordinary judges. This is meant to
take the form of a "direct Amparo" because it is directly submitted before the Supreme
Court or the Circuit Tribunals. 336 The recourse is different from the action because the
recourse is used to claim the revision of an ordinary judicial resolution, and the action is
employed to ask the revision of the constitutionality of a law. 337
This recourse was originally introduced by the jurisprudence of the Supreme
Court to harmonize Articles 103 338 and 133 339 of the Federal Constitution. Thus, the
Supreme Court centralized the constitutional review of laws in the Federal Judicial
Branch without affecting the state courts' duty to execute the precepts of the Federal
332 FlX-ZAMUDIO, supra note 46, at 379. See also Camargo, supra note 3 12, at 420.
333DlCClONARlO JURIDICO, supra note 56, at 1 59. See also Fix-Zamudio, supra note 46, at 379.
334 Fix-Zamudio, supra note 46, at 379. See also Camargo, supra note 3 12, at 420.
335 FlX-ZAMUDIO, supra note 46, at 379. (Stating that the decision of the District Judge may be subject to
revision by the Supreme Court if the claimant considers it is necessary). See also Camargo, supra note 312
at 420.
336 Fix-Zamudio, supra note 46, at 380. (The recourse of unconstitutionality of laws has its basis in the
Article 133 of the Constitution which states both that the Federal Constitution is the Supreme Law of the
Union and that state judges are bound by the precepts of this Constitution). See also Camargo, supra note
312, at 420.
337 FlX-ZAMUDIO, supra note 46, at 380.
338 CONSTITUCION DE LOS ESTADOS Unidos Mexicanos, Third Title, Chapter Fourth, article 103.
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Constitution over the dispositions of the State Constitutions which may be in opposition
to the Supreme Law.340
The third category ofAmparo is known as the Cassation-Amparo, which has as its
finality to examine the legality of definitive sentences dictated in civil, criminal, and
administrative suits, and in labor arbitration. 341 This category of Amparo is regarded as
the most important because it offers relief to legally injured people against definitive
judgements that otherwise cannot be challenged through any ordinary recourse. 342
This claim impugns the sentences when they violate the due process of law or the
individual guarantees of the petitioner.343 The Cassation-Amparo or Judicial Amparo, as
it is also known, became alive in the Supreme Court jurisprudence with regard to Article
14 of the Constitution of 1857. The current Mexican constitution, promulgated in 1917,
recognizes it in Article 1 4, which forbids the retroactivity of law and the deprivation of
life, liberty, possessions, or rights without due process. 344
The Administrative Amparo is the fourth category ofAmaparo in the classification
that this work undertakes. The Administrative Amparo is employed to defend the interest
of private parties against acts of the Public Administration and also to challenge the
judgement of the Federal Fiscal Tribunal, which, as an administrative facility of delegated
339 Constitucion de LOS Estados Unidos Mexicanos, Seventh Title, Chapter Fourth, article 133.
340 Camargo, supra note 3 12, at 42
1
341 Fix-ZAMUDIO, supra note 46, at 381. See also Camargo, supra note 312, at 421
342DlCClONARlO JURIDICO, supra note 56, at 159. See also Camargo, supra note 312, at 422. (Stating that
this kind of Amparo "is the most effective filter against the corruption and prevarication of ordinary
judges").
343 Camargo, supra note 3 12, at 422. See also Fix-ZAMUDIO, supra note 46, at 381-382.
344 Camargo, supra note 312, at 422 (Commenting also that the Mexican Cassation-Amparo "is similar to
the French cassation system, since it has also adopted the procedure of reexpedition, as follows: If the
amparo is granted, the judge in the original suit is obligated to pronounce a new sentence or arbitration
according to the guidelines established by the Supreme Court or by the Circuit Tribunals. In the Spanish
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jurisdiction, has the capacity to deliver judgements on the cases submitted against
decisions in fiscal and administrative controversies. 345
The administrative Amparo is divided into two branches: first, this recourse is
employed against definitive resolutions of the public administration when they affect the
guarantees of an individual. 346 Under this concept, the Amparo has the role of litigious-
administrative jurisdiction not expressly attributed to the judicial bodies nor to a mixed
body. 347 Second, if the Amparo is submitted against sentences of the Federal Fiscal
Tribunal, this Amparo then takes the form of an administrative-cassation. This proceeding
is expedited by the affected revenue authority before the Supreme Court of Justice, and
therefore, it is seen also as an direct administrative Amparo. 3™
The fifth branch of the Amparo proceeding comes in the form of an Agrarian
Amparo, which has as its main purpose the establishment of particular rules to defend
groups of organized peasants in accordance with the Mexican system of communal
agrarian property. 349 This Amparo provides an exceptional procedure, which
considerably reduces the process requirements for the peasants, and confers to federal
judges the power to substitute the procedural legal mistakes that peasants may make
while expeding a suit. 35 ' The base on which the Agrarian Amparo rests is that peasants
system, on the contrary, the cassation tribunal is the only one that has the power to dictate a new
sentence"). See also Fix-Zamudio, supra note 46, at 381
.
345 Camargo, supra note 3 12, at 422, 423. See also DICCIONARIO JURIDICO, supra note 56, at 1 59.
346 Fix-ZAMUDiO, supra note 46, at 382. See also Camargo, supra note 3 12, at 423.
347 FIX-ZAMUDIO, supra note 46, at 382
348 Camargo, supra note 312, at 423. See also FlX-ZAMUDIO, supra note 46, at 383.
349 Camargo, supra note 3 12, at 423. See also DICCIONARIO JURIDICO, supra note 56, at 1 59
350
Id.
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generally lack of the legal knowledge and economic capacity as to obtain adequate
counseling. 351
As stated above, this is a brief and general study of a legal instrument that has
been brilliantly discussed by many prestigious legal scholars. Most of them have
extensively written large volumes about aspects of the Amparo; however, one can always
find that the classification of this institution is as variable as the many volumes in which
it is discussed.
2. The National Commission of Human Rights (La Comision Nacional de Derchos
Humanos)
The first Mexican institution that resembled the National Commission of Human
Rights was the Direction de Derechos Humanos, an organism assigned to the Secretary
of State during the presidency of Carlos Salinas de Gortari. 352 This Direction was created
in 1989 and was conceived to receive and resolve complaints. 353
In 1 990, the Federal Executive decreed the creation of a National Commission of
Human Rights, which was also a dependent organism of the Secretary of State. 354 The
creation of this new institution was a response to the growing number of complaints
351 Camargo, supra note 312, at 423
352
Joss Luis Lopez-Chavarria, Nuevos Aspectos en el estudio de los Derechos Humanos, in 84 BOLETIN
Mexicano DE DERECHO Comparado 1053, 1065 (Institute de Investigaciones Juridicas, Universidad
Autonoma de Mexico ed. 1995). See also Hector Fix-Fierro, Los Derechos Humanos entre Necesidad
Moral y Contingencia Social, in BOLETIN MEXICANO DE DERECHO COMPARADO 957, 969 footnote 42,
supra.
353 L6pez-Chavarria, supra note 352, at 1066. See also Fix-Fierro supra note 352, at 970 footnote 42.
354 L6pez-Chavarria, supra note 352, at 1066. See also Maria del Pilar Hernandez-Martinez, Mexico, las
Reformas Constitucionales de 1992, in 76 BOLETIN MEXICANO DE DERECHO COMPARADO 99, 104
(Instituto de Investigaciones Juridicas, Universidad Autonoma de Mexico ed. 1993).
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against human rights violations particularly since 1988. 355 Moreover, it is important to
remember that by the end of the 1980s, the Federal Government and the Revolutionary
Institutional Party were losing credence nationally and internationally because of the
doubtful triumph of Carlos Salinas de Gortari in the national elections of 1988; therefore,
it was imperative for the government to create an institution capable of restoring it some
of its legitimacy. 356
Some of the main features of this Commission were that its president was directly
appointed by the Mexican President; that its competence did not include matters related
to elections, labor, and jurisdiction; that its administrative process to accept a complaint
was too exigent and formalist; and that its resolutions lacked of coercivility. 357
The establishment of this Commission involved many kinds of problems and also
raised much criticism by legal scholars and politicians. 35n Some of the problems that the
Commission faced after it was installed were: first, the discrepancies between the
functions that the decree and the regulation delegated to this organism; second, the failure
of the decree to mention such essential aspects as the procedural rules to which claims
should be subjected; third, the moral character on which the Commission based its
resolutions; and fourth, the null knowledge of the functional role of such Commission by
acq
its creators.
Moreover, the direct inherence of the Executive in the appointment of the
president of the National Commission of Human Rights, and the executive character that
355
Fix-Fierro supra note 352, at 966 (Arguing that this increase of human rights violations was due to the
prosecution of drug dealers).
356
Id.
357
Lopez-Chavarria, supra note 352, at 1066.
358
Id.
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the very institution had gave birth to criticism and distrust towards the Commission. 360
Although its beginnings were difficult, the Commission received 3400 denounces and
resolved more than a half of them during its first year of existence. 361
In response to this reality, in 1991 the Federal Executive announced that it would
send an initiative to the Congress in order to propose the creation of a constitutional body
to protect human rights in Mexico. 362 In 1992, this constitutional organism became a
reality with the publication of a decree that amended Article 102 of the Federal
Constitution. 363 Said article establishes in its incise B that:
the Congress of the Union and the state legislatures shall establish
organisms responsible for the protection of the human rights granted by
the Mexican legal order. Such organisms shall receive complains against
administrative acts or omission of any authority, except those of the
Federal Judicial Power. These organisms shall formulate autonomous
public recommendations before the respective authority.
These organisms shall not be competent with regard to matters related to
elections, labor, orjurisdiction.
The organism created by the Federal Congress shall review any
disagreement regarding the recommendation, accord or omission of its
equivalent state organism.364
Thus, the 1991 National Commission of Human Rights inherited its name as the
new constitutional organism for the protection of human rights in Mexico. This new
National Commission of Human Rights also became a decentralized organism, which
359
Id.
360
Id
361 Emilio O. Rabasa, Reforma al Articulo 102 Constitucional: Creadon de la Comicion Nacional de
Derechos Humanos (CNDH), a Nivel Constitucional, in 74 BOLETIN MEXICANO DE DERECHO COMPARADO
573, 574 (Instituto de Investigaciones Juridicas, Universidad Aut6noma de Mexico ed. 1992). See also
Hernandez-Martinez, supra note 354, at 104 (Commenting that regardless the short period that this
Commission lasted, its work was valuable).
362 L6pez-Chavarria, supra note 352, at 1067.
363 Hector Fix-Fierro, La Reforma al Articulo 102 de la Constitucion, in BOLETIN MEXICANO DE DERECHO
Comparado223, 223 (Instituto de Investigaciones Juridicas, Universidad Autonoma de Mexico ed. 1993).
364 Constitucion Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, Third Title, Chapter Fourth, art. 102, §
B.
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enjoys its own legal status and budget. 365 It was meant to guarantee that its functionaries
would work freely, without fearing the existence of any other higher governmental office
above them. 366
This constitutional organism was furnished with an easier procedure for receiving
and resolving denounces; with a more accurate and congruent set of functions; with a
more precise competence; and with a new system of appeals. 367 Through this appeal
system, the Federal Commission may review the proceedings and resolutions issued by
the state commissions as well as the unfulfilled recommendations issued by the local
commissions against the authorities. 368
There are two kinds of complaints that can be brought before the National
Commission of Human Rights: the queja (complaint) and the impugnacion
(impugnment). 369 The complaint proceeds when the inactivity or omission of the state
commissions affects the human rights of the interested. The impugnment is used against
definitive resolutions of state commissions; and against definitive information of local
authorities concerning the fulfillment of the state commission's recommendations. 370
It is relevant to mention why aspects related to elections, labor, and jurisdiction
were excluded from the competence of the organism. First, matters related to elections
are regarded as heavily influenced by political debate, which could damage the impartial
character that the National Commission of Human Rights should have. Second, the
Commission does not accept complaints regarding labor problems because they mainly
365 L6pez-Chavarria, supra note 352, at 1068.
366
Id.
367
Id.
368
,d
369
Id. at 1069
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concern disputes between particulars. Third, the Commission is incompetent to review
aspects of jurisdiction because it must respect the independence of the Federal Judicial
Power to act. 371
Finally, the National Commission of Human Rights is an organism meant to offer
an alternative solution of administrative controversies regarding human rights violations
through a non-jurisdictional system. Therefore, it is interesting to ponder that its
recommendations are not binding in a country where even binding decisions of the courts
are some times disregarded.
C. Existing Mechanisms Protecting Constitutional Rights in the German Legal
System
When enacted in 1 949, the Basic Law was structured in such a way as to ensure
effective protection against dictatorship and neglect of human rights. 372 As stated in
section C of the second chapter of this work, the Parliamentary Council, while working
out the Basic Law, needed to consider that Nazis had gained power and had ignored
constitutional provisions precisely because of the weakness of the Weimar Constitution
of 191 9. 373
In addition to the concerns of the Parliamentary Council, the presence of the
military governors made it clear to the Germans that judicial review was implied in their
370
Id
371 Hernandez-Martinez, supra note 354, at 106.
372 Dieter Grimm, Human Rights and Judicial Review in Germany, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND JUDICIAL
Review, a Comparative Perspective 267, 270 (David M. Beatty Ed., 1994)
373 See supra p. 23- and note 104.
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concept of an independent judiciary. 374 Both the German desire to achieve a truly lawful
society and the Allied Powers' desire to ensure a democratic government for West
Germany gave birth to a special institution designed to enforce the constitution against
any other government authority. 375
This institution, which was established by the Parliamentary Council, is the
Federal Constitutional Court or Bundesverfassungsgericht founded with extensive
powers, among them judicial review. 37 ' This constitutional jurisdiction with the power to
review laws made it possible for the Basic Rights to be some thing more than "a mere
appendage of the Basic Law. 377
The Federal Constitutional Court has two main competencies with regard to
human rights:
374 KOMMERS, supra note 1 15, at 70. (Indicating that in a an aide-memoire sent to the framers of the Basic
Law, the military governors of west Germany noted: "The constitution should provide for an independent
judiciary to review federal legislation, to review the exercise of federal executive power, and to adjudicate
conflicts between federal and land authorities as well as between land authorities, and to protect the civil
rights and freedom of the individual").
375DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY,
7 (Duke University Press Durham and London 2 nd ed. 1997). See also Grimm, supra note 372, at 271 . See
also KOMMERS, supra note 1 15, at 70 (Commenting that it would be a mistake to presume that the military
governors imposed judicial review on a reluctant nation: "In the first place, the aide-memoire was not
released until after the parliamentary council had done most of its work. In the second place, German-
Allied correspondence during the time of the parliamentary council shows no disagreement on judicial
review.")
376Grimm, supra note 372, at 271. See also KOMMERS, supra note 375, at 7. See also KOMMERS, supra
note 115, at 71-72.
377
Starck, supra note 88, at 22.
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1 . Abstract and Concrete Judicial Review.
Under Article 93(1) 2378 of the Basic Law, the federal Constitutional Court can
review any law as to its conformity with the human rights contained in the Basic Law on
the basis of abstract judicial review. 37 ' The Constitutional Court is entitled to do so on
petition of the federal government, of the government of a land, or of one third of the
members of the parliament. In exceptional cases, the Constitutional Court can also
review a law on a petition of a person whose basic rights are directly affected by that
statute and not merely by its application. 380 When deciding cases on abstract judicial
review, the Bundesverfassungsgericht is meant to devote itself to the "objective"
judgment of the validity or invalidity of a legal norm or statute. 381
Under Article 1 00382 of the Basic law, the Constitutional Court can review the
conformity of any law with the human rights included in the Basic Law on petition of any
ordinary court which has to employ a law whose constitutionality is doubtful. 383 The
Bundesverfassungsgerich executes this review of laws on the basis of Concrete Judicial
378
F.R.G. CONST, art. 93(1)2 "The Federal Constitutional Court decides: . . .2. in cases of differences of
opinion or doubts on the formal and material compatibility of Federal law or Land law with this Basic Law,
or on the compatibility of Land law with other Federal law, at the request of the Federal government, of a
Land government or of one-third of the Bundestag members; . . ."
379Grimm, supra note 372, at 271. See also supra note 314 and accompanying text. See also KOMMERS,
supra note 1 15, at 106 (Stating that Abstract Judicial Review is not "an adversary proceeding in strict legal
sense. But neither are the decisions of the Court in such cases merely advisory opinions; for the question
of a law's validity is squarely before the Court, and a decision against it validity renders it null and void.")
380 Grimm, supra note 372, at 271. See also F.R.G. CONST, art. 93(1)2, 4a
381 KOMMERS, supra note 375, at 1. (Explaining that the proceeding is described as objective because "it is
intended to vindicate neither an individual's subjective right nor the claim of the official entity petitioning
for review; its sole purpose is to declare what the Constitution means.")
382
F.R.G. CONST, art. 100(1) "Where a court considers a law unconstitutional, the validity of which is
relevant to its decision, the proceedings shall be stayed, and a decision shall be obtained from the Land
court competent for constitutional disputes if the matter concerns the violation of the constitution of a
Land, or from the Federal Constitutional Court if the matter concerns the violation of the Basic Law. . ."
383 Grimm, supra note 372, at 271
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Review. 384 The ordinary court's petition must be signed by those judges who have a
voice in support of referral and accompanied by a pronouncement of the legal provision
at issue, the provision of the Basic Law supposedly violated, and the magnitude to which
a constitutional ruling is essential to resolve the controversy. 385
As it is not the duty of the Federal Constitutional Court to engage in judicial
review every time it is suggested by ordinary courts, the Bundesverfassungsgerich is
extremely stern in examining the conditions of reference when a court conveys a statute
before it on the grounds of unconstitutionality. 386 The Federal Constitutional Court is
obliged to enforce the constitution only in the cases pre-established in Article 100(1) of
the Basic Law. 387
Concrete Judicial Review is a greatly significant form of procedure in the judicial
practice of Germany. Statistically, it is second in the ranking list behind the procedure
for individual constitutional complaints. Nonetheless, its importance does not lie in their
number of cases because most of the cases submitted to the Constitutional Court are not
successful but in the fact that consequences that may arise from a particular statute are
realized only in the day-to-day practice of law. 388
The outcome of both Abstract and Concrete Judicial Review has been a high
standard of exacting compliance of the Basic Law and its rights. The complaint of
384
Id.
385 KOMMERS, supra note 375, at 13. (Adding that the Federal Constitutional Court will discard the case "if
the judges below it manifest less than a genuine conviction that a law or provision of law is
unconstitutional or if the case can be decided without settling the constitutional question.") See also
Kommers, supra note 1 15, at 105-106.
386 Jorn Ipsen, Constitutional Review ofLaws in, 23 MAIN PRINCIPLES OF THE GERMAN BASIC LAW, supra
note 113, at 107, 114-115.
387
Ipsen, supra note 386, at 115.
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unconstitutionality is strongly popular as a source of potential relief, although in most
cases it does not prosper in the Constitutional Court, either for lack of substance or lack
of importance to the evolution of Constitutional law. 38
'
1
However, lower courts are ready
to find constitutional aspects in their docket and to present such issues. "So far these
structures have strengthened most constitutional rights to the extent that it seems, as if the
constitution and the courts and not the people themselves, are the best guardians of
human rights."390
In addition, it is under Article 100 of the Basic Law that the
Bundesverfassungsgerich, in exceptional circumstances, can also review a law on a
petition of a person whose basic rights are directly affected by the law and not just by its
application.
391
2. Individual Complaints
Under Article 93(1 )4a392 of the Basic Law, and upon individual complaint, the
Constitutional Court can review any act of a public authority to verify its conformity with
human rights. 393 Before submitting a complaint to the Constitutional Court, the
389 Goerlich, supra note 122, at 51
390
Id.
391 Grimm, supra note 372, at 271
392 F.R.G. CONST, art. 93(l)4a "The Federal Constitutional Court decides:. . .4a. on complaints of
unconstitutionality, which may be entered by any person who claims that one of his basic rights or one of
his rights under paragraph (4) of Article 20 or under Article 33, 38, 101, 103, or 104 has been violated by
public authority;. . ."
393 Grimm, supra note 372, at 271 . See also Ipsen, supra note 386, at 125. See also Kommers, supra note
375, at 14.
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individual must first exhaust all possible means of relief in ordinary courts. 394 However,
the Bundesverfassungsgerich will except a constitutional complaint from exhausting all
legal remedies if this complaint involves an issue of "general importance" or if the
complainant will suffer a serious harm by exhausting all his/her remedies. 395
This kind of complaint must be used within a certain period of time, specify the
incompatible action or omission and the agency responsible of that, and particularize the
constitutional right that has been transgressed. 396 In conformity with Article 93(1) 4a of
the Basic Law, any individual, who can be a natural or a legal person possessing rights
under the Basic Law, may initiate a complaint of unconstitutionality if one of his or her
rights has been violated by public authority. 397
Constitutional complaints may also be settled against any governmental action,
including judicial decision, administrative decrees, and legislative acts in accordance to
the public authority clause of Article 93(1) 4a. 391 With regard to judicial decisions, the
complainant must file his complaint within a month after the decision has been handed
down. With regard to a statute not the subject of a judicial proceeding, and concerning
which no other legal redress is possible, a constitutional complaint can be brought against
it within a year after its enactment.399
However, jurisdiction over individual complaints is not a universal legal remedy
that individuals may employ at any time. To submit a complaint to the federal
394 Grimm, supra note 372, at 271 . See also KOMMERS, supra note 375, at 14.
395 KOMMERS, supra note 1 15, at 107
396 KOMMERS, supra note 375, at 14. See also KOMMERS, supra note 115, at 107 (Adding that the
complainant must submit any accompanying document relevant to the case.).
397 KOMMERS, supra note 375, at 14. See also supra note 328 and accompanying text.
398 KOMMERS, supra note 375, at 15. See also KOMMERS, supra note 115, at 107. See also Ipsen, supra
note 386, at 125.
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Constitutional Court, a complainant must have his or her rights affected by an act of the
state.
400
This is a consequence of the principal purpose of individual complaints:
Jurisdiction over individual complaints is not meant as a general protection of the
constitution but rather as a means to defend the individual citizen against encroachments
of his or her fundamental rights under the constitution.401
In addition, the injury suffered by the complainant must be a present and direct
consequence of the encroachment on his or her rights by the governmental act. Indeed,
the motive for the "present" consequence requirement is to keep out acts that have been
disposed of, or future acts; the second requirement is used as an obstacle to in rem
proceedings intended against statutes by individuals not adversely affected by a statute. 402
3. Some Effects of the Application of these Methods to the Protection of Human Rights
Indeed, the first effect that must be mentioned is that these methods have
broadened the scope of human rights protection. 403 As already mentioned in the first
chapter, section C of this work, the Basic Law starts by setting up the protection and
inviolability of human dignity, whose protection is the duty of all state.404 This guiding
399 KOMMERS, supra note 1 15, at 107
400
Ipsen, supra note 386, at 125.
401
Id.
402
Id. (Adding that commonly acts are not self-executing. "Their practical embodiment usually requires a
large number of supplementary actions, such as administrative measures or judicial decisions before a law
is finally applied to a particular case. A fiscal law itself, for example, does not affect the individual
taxpayer because the individual's liability to pay taxes has to be put into concrete form by administrative
practice, that is to say it needs a special executive act (tax assessment) to bring it into effect. If a statute
requires such a special executive act to impose direct injury to the individual and if this act has not yet been
carried out, the Bundesverfassungsgerich must reject the complaint as inadmissible.")
403 Grimm, supra note 372, at 274.
404 See supra p. 25 and note 1 14.
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principle, which rules all the constitution and commands the state to respect and protect
human dignity, is followed by an entire catalogue of human rights. 405 Such catalogue
contains a wide range of social relations, individual occupations, and various institutions
which have a tendency to be menaced by governments regarding historical incidence.406
The Bundesverfassungsgerich's application of the articles concerning human
rights in the Basic Law has enhanced their relevance. For instance, by the content of
Article 2, the Constitutional Court established an entire system of judicial review and
human rights protection, which guards human activity not even considered by an article
in the Basic Law. 40 Accordingly, any time the government interferes with a human
activity of conduct not mentioned in some constitutional guarantee, the
Bundesverfassungsgerich can review it under Article 2(1).
408
Another important asset introduced by the Constitutional Court to protect human
right is the principle of proportionality, which derives from Article 1 and sets human
rights as superior to the law.
409
In this context, the Bundesverfassungsgerich decided that
laws could restrict human rights, but only in order to make conflicting rights compatible,
to protect the rights of other people or to guard important community interest. The
Constitutional Court followed to say that any restraint of fundamental rights not only
405 See supra pp. 25-30
405 Grimm, supra note 372, at 275. See supra pp. 23-25.
407 Grimm, supra note 372, at 275
408
Id. (Citing the case BVerfGE 6, 32 (36 f.) Elfes; 80, 137 (152 f.) Riding in the wood; and dissenting
opinion, p. 164 ff.). See also Ipsen, supra note 386, at 127.
409
Id. See also Kommers, supra note 375, at 46. (Explaining that in general terms, the principle of
proportionality is employed by the Constitutional Court to determinate whether legislation and other
governmental acts conform to the values and principles of the Basic Law.)
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requires a constitutionally valid objective but also needs to be proportional to the rank
and importance of the right at stake. 410
To make certain that legislation and other governmental acts are in conformity
with the values and principles of the Basic Law, the Bundesverfassungsgerich applies a
three-step test. First, any time parliament passes a law infringing on a fundamental right,
the instrumentality used must be appropriate to the achievement of a lawful end. Second,
the question is whether it is indispensable to achieve this goal. Third, the question is
whether an appropriate relationship exists between the human right limited by law and
the purpose of the restriction. The burden on the right must not be extreme relative to the
benefits secured by the state's objective.411
Another main feature of the Constitutional Court defense of human rights is its
interpretation of these rights not only as subjective ones but also as objective principles. 412
On one hand, while interpreted as subjective rights, human rights oblige the state to
restraint from taking particular actions. On the other hand, as objectives ones, human
rights oblige the state to perform specific actions either to protect them or to give true
effect to these rights.
413
4,0 Grimm, supra note 372, at 275. (Citing the case BVerfGE 19, 342 (348 ff.) 30, 292 (315; Mineral Oil
Stock Pile; 6\, 126(134))
411
Id. at 276. See also KOMMERS, supra note 375, at 46.
412 Grimm, supra note 372, at 276. (Citing the Liith case as a leading decision, BVerfGE 7, 198 (204ff.)
See also Starck, supra note 88, at 33. (Commenting that by the end of the nineteenth century, the legal
character of fundamental rights was recognized as objective law issued by the state against its authorities.
By 1914, scholars started to look at fundamental rights as genuine subjective rights. During the Weimar
Reich, the character of human rights became more and more recognized as subjective without ever
becoming applicable, due to the lack of a constitutional control over the legislature, through which the
citizen could have exercised his or her rights.) See also Kommers, supra note 375, at 48.
413 Grimm, supra note 372, at 276. See also Starck, supra note 88, at 33.
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The subjectivity of these rights comes from their very nature. As long as human
rights are clearly rights of the subject, they are subjective rights.414 If for any reason, a
fundamental right lacks subjective character, this character must be particularly
established. In the case that fundamental rights embody objective guarantees, this kind of
guarantees cannot supersede the subjective basis of the fundamental rights. 415
The Constitutional Court has made several departures from the premise that
human rights are also objective principles. 416 The principle of objectivity regarding
human rights has had a special impact in the area of private law, which is no longer out of
the influence of human rights protection. 417 In the Liith case, the
Bundesverfassungsgerich stressed that the objective system of values of the Basic Law
"expresses and reinforces the validity of the enumerated basic rights."418 The
Constitutional Court went on to state that according to the relevance of this system of
values, these objective values "must apply as a constitutional axiom throughout the whole
legal system," affecting private as well as public law.
419 Under this new doctrine, all
decisions of the ordinary courts are subjected to constitutional review, supposing that the
law they interpret and apply affects a human right.420
The objective system of values has given birth to a collateral search for a
congruent theory of basic right, which faces an interpretative difficulty when it is
confronted with open-ended words such as "democracy," "constitutional order," and "free
4
Starck, supra note 88, at 33.
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Id. at 34.
6 Grimm, supra note 372, at 277.
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8 KOMMERS, supra note 375, at 48.
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420 Grimm, supra note 372, at 277
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democratic basic order."421 To this extent, German constitutional theorists have advanced
five normative theories of fundamental rights: liberal, institutional, value/oriented,
democratic, and social:
Liberal theory, based on postulates of economic liberty and enlightened
self-determination, emphasizes the negative rights of the individual
against the state. Institutional theory focuses on guaranteed rights
associated with organizations or communities such as religious groups,
the media, universities (research and teaching), and marriage and the
family. Value oriented theory places its emphasis on human dignity as it
relates to rights flowing from the nature of the human personality.
Democratic theory is concerned with certain political functions incident
to the rights of speech and association and the role of elections and
political parties. Social theory, finally, highlights the importance of
socialjustice, cultural rights, and economic security. ^-^
All these normative theories find support in either the literature of constitutional theory or
decisions of the Bundesverfassungsgerich, which appears to be happy to decide human
rights question on a case-by-case basis, using what it considers as the most persuasive
theory appropriate in a given circumstance.423
Another inference that the Constitutional Court has gained from the concept that
human rights are also objective principles is that governments may be compelled to
furnish an individual or a group of individuals with the instrumentality necessary to make
use of a right. This new concept introduced a shift from a purely formal tenet of freedom
to a substantial notion of constitutionally protected freedom.424
This substantial notion of constitutionally protected freedom consists of the use of
freedom by the individual to obtain from government the necessary assistance to make
421 KOMMERS, supra note 375, at 49.
422
Id.
423
Id.
424 Grimm, supra note 372, at 278.
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human rights valuable. This notion depends upon the condition that, without government
help, a fundamental right would be totally worthless for a person. It is also true when
government constraints the use of a right to conditions which could not ordinarily be met
without public furtherance. 425
The first step towards this new concept was taken by the Constitutional Court in
the Numerus Clausus case, which involved the medical schools of the universities of
Hamburg and Munich.426 This case emerged out of limiting admission policies which
students, rejected because of these restraints but otherwise seemingly qualified for
admission, sued against the regulations before the administrative courts in their
corresponding states. 427 Questioning the harmony of these admission policies with the
right of all Germans to freely select a trade or an occupation under Article 12,428 the two
courts submitted the question to the Bundesverfassungsgerich.429
The Constitutional Court stated that education is the first step in pursuing a
profession; "both are integral parts of a coordinated life process."430 Furthermore, in the
field of education, the Court said, the constitutional guardianship of basic rights is not
restricted to the function of defense against state intervention conventionally attributed to
the fundamental liberty rights. According to the Bundesverfassungsgerich, basic rights in
their capacity as objective norms also set up a value order that stands for a fundamental
425
Id.
426
Id. (Citing the BVerGE 33, 303 (330 ff.) Numerus Clausus case.) See also KOMMERS, supra note 375,
at 282.
427 KOMMERS, supra note 375, at 282.
428 See supra pp. 28-29 and note 139.
429 KOMMERS, supra note 375, at 282
430
Id. at 283.
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constitutional decision in all areas of law. 431 The Constitutional Court finally declared
that "any absolute numerical limit on admission into a course of study is unconstitutional
unless the institution applying it can demonstrate that all available space is completely
filled."
432
A characteristic regarding the decision of this case was that the
Bundesverfassungsgerich refrained from obliging the government to expend a huge
amount of money to fulfill its duty, and instead, it ruled that in the long run the
government should take steps to ameliorate the situation. 433
A third principle the Constitutional Court has developed from the objective
character of human rights is a duty of the legislatures to protect human rights against
threats from private individuals or groups. 434 This principle arose from the First Abortion
case, which involved an act of the legislature making abortions unpunishable if
performed within the first three moths of pregnancy. 435 The Bundesverfassungsgerich
decided that the right to life in Article 2(2)
436
of the Basic Law not only prohibits the
government from annihilating life itself but, in addition, requires the state to defend
human life against transgressions by others. 437
431
Id. at 284.
432
Id. at 288.
433 Grimm, supra note 372, at 279.
434
Id.
435
Id. (Citing BVerGE 39, 1(42). See also Stern, supra note 88, at 51. (Pointing out that the Constitutional
Court concluded, "on the basis of legislative history that referenced the particular high value placed on
human life in reaction to the Nazi experience, that everyone included every life-possessing human
individual and not merely every finished person.") See also KOMMERS, supra note 375, at 53-54.
(Discussing the form and effect of the Court's decisions, the author comments that while invalidating the
abortion statute, the Constitutional Court practically rewrote the law, which Parliament afterward felt
obligated to pass.)
436 See supra p. 25 and note 1 19.
437 Grimm, supra note 372, at 279
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Despite the abortion case which gave birth to this new approach, the typical case
for the use of the protection of fundamental rights against threats stemming from third
parties is a case involving new technical, economic, or social developments endangering
basic rights.
438 According to the Bundesverfassungsgerich, if a human right is seriously
disturbed by developments such atomic energy, automatic data processing, genetic
engineering, etc., the legislature is constitutionally obliged to take measures securing the
right threatened.
439
Contractual relations also involve the protection of human rights against threats
from private individuals. If the distribution of balance within the contract conveys heavy
disadvantages of one party's basic rights, the legislature is bound to take protective
measures. However, in the absence of such protective measures on the part of the
legislature, the ordinary courts are required to ponder human rights as much as possible
within the setting of statutory interpretation when they construe and enforce contacts. 440
The last conclusion of the Constitutional Court regarding the objective dimension
of human rights may be described as the protection of human rights by procedure and
organization. A case in this context may arise when a fundamental right can be exercised
only if an appropriate procedure is implemented, and it is the duty of the legislature to
provide for such a law.441
438
Id. at 280
439
Id. at 281
440
Id.
441
Id. (Explaining that it occurs when a legal position derived from a human right such as the asylum right
can be exercised only if a suitable procedure is provided.)
Chapter III
A. Establishing a Point of Comparison between United States and German Law
regarding Human Rights Protection.
As seen in preceding chapters, the United States and Germany have a strong
commitment to the protection of human rights within their legal systems. 442 This
commitment is rooted in different backgrounds that will not be discussed in this section;
however, the means by which this commitment is fulfilled deserves a close view.
On the one hand, in the North-American legal system, the Substantive Due
Process of Law of the Fourteenth Amendment has played an important role in securing
the protection of other civil liberties against actions of the states which violate
fundamental rights. 443 The Supreme Court has utilized the Due Process Clause to expand
the scope of the Bill of Rights and to standardize its application nationwide. This work of
the Court has been known as the "incorporation process" of the Bill of Rights into the
Fourteenth Amendment.444
On the other hand, the German legal system possesses a human-rights-distinctive
feature, which has also played a mayor role in the protection of the fundamental rights
442 See supra pp. 3 1 -45 & 57-70.
443 Witt, supra note 157, at 378. See also STONE, supra note 2 at 804
444 Stone, supra note 2 at 804. See also PR1TCHETT, supra note 1, at 247. See also William J. Brennan,
Jr.; The Bill of Rights and the States in, The Evolving Constitution, Essays ON THE Bill OF Rights
and the U.S. Supreme Court 254, 256-257 (Norman Dorsen Ed., 1989). See also Antonin Scalia,
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included in Basic Law. In the context of Article 1(1) of the Basic Law, human dignity is
the immovable base of the constitutional order, which the state is obliged not only to
respect but also to protect.445 In addition to this important precept, Article 1(3) settles the
character of directly valid law that human rights enjoy; and second, the binding effect of
these rights over the legislature, executive, and judiciary. 446
In addition to these principles, which indeed bear an important impact regarding
human rights protection, the Courts responsible for the enforcement of such rights have
played a key role throughout recent history. The U.S. Supreme Court and the federal
Constitutional Court of Germany have been the institutions that have shaped the
constitutional protection of human rights in the national level. 447 These courts have the
authority to determine the proper application of the rights bestowed in the constitutions of
their countries.
448
In both cases, this authority emanates from the institution of Judicial
Review, which is perhaps the finest contribution made by the United States to political
theory and civil liberty. 449
Federal Constitutional Guarantees ofIndividual Rights in the United States ofAmerica in, HUMAN RIGHTS
and Judicial REVIEW, supra note 281, at 57, 66-67. See supra pp. 33-44.
445 Grimm, supra note 372, at 270.
446
Id. Diirig, supra note 88, at 1 3. See also Ress, supra note 88, at 117.
447 Grimm, supra note 372, at 65, 271
.
448
Id. See also Danielle E. Finck, Judicial Review: The United States Supreme Court Versus the German
Constitutional Court, 20 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 123, 125-126. (1997). See also William Safran, The
Influence of American Constitutionalism in Postwar Europe: The Bonn Republic Basic Law and the
Constitution of the French Republic in, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM ABROAD, SELECTED ESSAYS IN
Comparative Constitutional History 91, 103 (George Athan Billias Ed., 1990). See also Norman
Dorsen, How American Judges Interpret the Bill ofRights, 1 1 Const. Comment. 379, 379 (1994). See also
David L. Faigman, Reconciling Individual Rights and Government Interests Madisonian Principles versus
Supreme Court Practice, 78 Va. L. Rev. 1521, 1522 (1992).
449 Grimm, supra note 372, at 59, 271. See also Dorsen, supra note 448, at 379. See also BREWER-
Carias, supra note 228, at 138. See also Finck, supra note 448, at 124-125. See also Helmut Steinberger,
American Constitutionalism and German Constitutional Development in, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
RIGHTS, 199, 214 ( Luis Henkin and Albert J. Rosental Ed., 1990)
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In general terms, judicial review is the power of the courts to decide upon the
constitutionality of legislative and executive acts. 450 A comparative brief analysis of this
institution in Germany and the United States demonstrates that judicial review can be
implemented in more than one way. Consequently, the ability of each of these countries
to interpret and advance their respective constitutions, and thus to apply judicial review,
relies on particular conditions.
451
One of this conditions is whether judicial review is applied within the boundaries
of a decentralized or centralized system. 452 The United States has a decentralized system
of judicial review, which gives all the organs within it the power to decide the
constitutionality of state acts. 453 In this context, it is the duty of the entire judiciary to
disregard any norm that conflicts with the wording of the Constitution, and to apply the
latter in the given case.454 All conflicts, whatever their nature, are decided by the same
courts, by the same procedures, in essentially similar circumstances. Constitutional
concerns may be found in any case and do not get special treatment. 455 The United States
Supreme Court then enjoys original and appellate jurisdiction. 456
450
Finck, supra note 448, at 124. See also Dorsen, supra note 448, at 379
451
Finck, supra note 448, at 124-125
452
Id. at 125-126.
453
Id. at 126. See also MAURO CAPPELLETTI, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD, 46 (1971)
(Mentioning that this system of judicial review is also known as the "American" system of control. This
due to the fact that decentralized judicial review in one sense finds its beginning in the United States,
"where judicial review remains the most characteristic and 'unique' institution.") See also BREWER-
Carias, supra note 228, at 138.. (Concerning judicial review as a power of all courts, Brewer comments
that in the United States there is no special judicial body empowered to decide upon the constitutionality of
state acts. Thus, all courts have the power of judicial review of constitutionality, and none of them have
their jurisdiction limited in any special way at all over the decisions of constitutional questions.)
454
Finck, supra note 448, at 13 1-132. See also CAPPELLETTI, supra note 453, 52.
455
Luis Favoreu, Constitutional Review in Europe in, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND RIGHTS, supra note 449, at
38,41. See also BREWER-CARIAS supra note 228, at 1 37.
456 Brewer-Carias supra note 228, at 144.
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According to this doctrine, and as a result of the United States' federal system,
three ramifications of judicial review can be established in this country: national judicial
review, concerning the power of all courts to pass judgment upon the validity of acts of
Congress under the United States Constitution; federal judicial review, pertaining to the
power and duty of all courts to prefer the United States Constitution over all
contradictory state constitutional provisions and statutes; and states' judicial review,
regarding the power of state courts to pass verdict upon the validity of acts of the state
legislatures under the particular state Constitutions. 457 Because of its importance for this
work, the current comments are concerned only with the national judicial review.
In contrast to the system used in the United States, Germany exercises a
centralized system of judicial review, which presupposes the existence of a court
especially established to deal exclusively with constitutional issues. 458 This variant of
judicial review organization is due to the fact that Germany, like many other European
countries, differentiates among categories of litigation (administrative, civil, criminal,
etc.) as well as the courts that decide cases in each category.459 The centralized system of
judicial review has been favored by European civil law countries which have more than
one "higher" court. 460 This fact compels these countries to look for a specialized
constitutional court, modestly staffed and limited in jurisdiction. 461
457
Id.
458
Favoreu, supra note 455, at 41
.
459
Id.
460
Finck, supra note 448, at 125. See also Donald P. Kommers, German Constitutionalism: A
Prolegomenon, 40 Emory L.J. 837, 840. See also Sarah Wright Sheive, Central and Eastern European
Constitutional Courts and the Antimajoritarian Objection to Judicial Review, 26 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus.
1201, 1205. (Commenting that judicial review is structured differently in Europe than in the United States.
"The most significant difference between review in the two regions is that the European model features a
concentrated, or centralized, system of review. Under a system of concentrated judicial review,
90
Unlike the unitary U.S. system, which is supervised by the U.S. Supreme Court,
the German judiciary has several higher courts, which are responsible for ordinary, civil,
criminal, administrative, labor, tax, and social matters.462 Thus, when an ordinary court
finds that a statute involved in any civil, criminal, or administrative case is
unconstitutional, it will refer the question to the Constitutional Court.463 The
Constitutional Court as the supreme protector of the Constitution has a monopoly on a
wide range ofjurisdictional powers ascribed to it in the Constitution.464
Then, although the concept ofjudicial review in Germany was strongly influenced
by the North-American example, particularly so with respect to the protection of
fundamental rights of individuals, it was to be undertaken by the
Bundesverfassungsgericht as a court of specialized jurisdiction.465 It is worth mention
that besides its centralized character, the German Constitutional Court, is also separate
from and independent of the regular judicial system, emphasizing its unique character as
the protector of the Basic Law. 466
constitutional review is exercised only by specialized courts that have been specially created to decide
constitutional issues. . . . Constitutional Courts are created expressly by provisions in European
constitutions, and they are independent of ordinary judicial structures." )
461 Sheive, supra note 460, at 1202.
462
Id. at 1204-1205.
463
Finck, supra note 448, at 127.
464
Id. See also Brfwkr-Carias, supra note 228, at 205..(Commenting that these powers may be classified
in six groups of attributions through which the Bundesverfassungsgericht guarantees "the protection of the
politico-constitutional order; the distribution of state powers; the electoral representative character of the
political system; the protection of fundamental rights; the interpretation of the Constitution, and control of
constitutionality of all normative acts. . . Specifically the Federal Constitution empowers the tribunal to
decide 'on complaints of unconstitutionality' which may be entered by any person who claims that one of
his basic constitutional rights has been violated by public authority. This power. . .has given rise to a very
important recourse of protection of fundamental rights against public authorities.")
465
Id. See also Kommers, supra note 460, at 840. See also Sheive, supra note 460, at 1202
466 Kommers, supra note 460, at 840.
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Another important consideration regarding judicial review is the extent to which
this institution renders a state action unconstitutional.
467 Whether a judgment resulting
from judicial review should affect only the parties to the case or whether it should affect
all future litigants gives use to the question of "inter partes" and "erga omnes" effects.
While both the centralized and decentralized systems of judicial review offer different
answers to this question, practical considerations in each system have resulted in an
impressive convergence between them.468
Generally, the United States Supreme Court's decisions concerning constitutional
questions have relevance only for the parties to the case. 469 As a result, the decisions
themselves have no general effect or erga omnes effect. 470 Any statute declared
unconstitutional is neither annulled by the court nor repealed by it. Thus, the law
declared null and void by a court remains on the books despite the adverse decision on its
validity.
471
However, this situation has been amply changed in the United States by the
application of the principle of stare decisis. 41 ' Under this principle the Supreme Court
usually follows the reasoning of its former opinions, so, the principle of constitutional
interpretation that the Court applied in yesterday's lawsuit can be presumed to be the
standard it will apply in tomorrow's lawsuit too. 473 As a consequence, it is the tendency
467 CAPPELLETTI, supra note 453, at 85.
468
Id.
469 Brewer-Carias, supra note 228, at 149. See also CAPPELLETTI, supra note 453, at 86.
470 BREWER-CARIAS, supra note 228, at 149.
471
Id.
472 CAPPELLETTI, supra note 453, at 86..
473 Grimm, supra note 372, at 60. Brewer-Carias, supra note 228, at 149.
92
of civic responsibility and prudence for citizens and officials to standardize their actions
to the most recently constitutional decisions of the Supreme Court.474
Hence, although the American system makes no explicit reference for decisions
with erga omnes effect, the binding precedent of the Supreme Court's decisions over
inferior courts carries effects not strictly limited to the parties to the case since they will
bar contrary decisions in future cases. 475 "Thus the principle of stare decisis means that a
judgement of unconstitutionality will become effective, practically speaking, erga
omnes.'" In this context, the principle of stare decisis has contributed to the uniformity
and certainty of the interpretation of the constitution in the United States as in other
common law countries where the decentralized system ofjudicial review operates. 476
On the other hand, erga omnes effect is an integral part of the German
Constitutional Court's decisions, which are always obligatory for all constitutional organs
of the federation and of the states, as well as the authorities, the courts, and, naturally, for
the individuals.
477
For instance, any decision of the Bundesverfassungsgericht concerning
the constitutionality of a statute "shall have the force of law" and, as law, shall be
published in the Federal Gazette, along with other federal statutes. As a foreseen result, a
decision of the Constitutional Court binds all of the entities and individuals mentioned
above. 478
474 Grimm, supra note 372, at 60.
475 Cappelletti, supra note 453, at 56.
476
Id. See also Brewer-Carias, supra note 228, at 150.
477 Brewer-Carias, supra note 228, at 213-214. Cappelletti, supra note 453, at 85-86. (Making
reference to the Austrian Constitutional Court as the archetype of the centralized systems where a decision
of unconstitutionality by a Constitutional Court give rise to an annulment with erga omnes effect.
Comparing Austria, Italy, and Germany with the United States, the author refers to the erga omnes effect of
judicial review in the European countries.)
478 Kommers, supra note 460, at 840.
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The decisions of the Bundesverfassungsgericht have erga omnes effect principally
in cases of abstract or concrete control of norms,479 and the decisions have the same force
as a statute in the sense that its erga omnes character includes the Constitutional Court
itself.
480
As already discussed in the former chapter, the German Constitutional Court
practices abstract and concrete judicial review. 481 In contrast to the
Bundesverfassungsgericht' s practice of abstract judicial review, the United States
Supreme Court review only constitutional issues in the context of ripe adversarial
lawsuits where parties have standing to bring a case. 482
In short, judicial review in the United States is incidental to ordinary litigation,
which has been the principal tendency in the American system. 483 This incidental
character of judicial review, essential to the diffuse system, has been advanced by the
Supreme Court by interpreting the term "case and controversy"484 included in Article 3,
Section 2 of the Constitution. 485 In addition, the Supreme Court will not decide a
419 See supra pp. 59, 60, &61.
480 Brewer-Carias, supra note 228, at 214. (Once accepting jurisdiction over a petition, a constitutional
complaint or a court referral, the Bundesverfassungsgericht is not bound by the content of the complaint.
The Constitutional Court has ex officio powers to raise another constitutional question and to decide ultra
petita. This means that if other disposition of the same statute is incompatible with the constitution, or
another norm of federal law, the Constitutional Court can declare it null at the same time.)
481 See supra pp. 59, 60, & 61
.
482 Sheive, supra note 460, at 1203. See also Favoreu, supra note 455, at 41
.
See also Brewer-Carjas, supra note 228, at 144.
483 Sheive, supra note 460, at 1203. See also Brewer-Carias, supra note 228, at 144.
484 U.S. Const. Art. 3, Sec 2. "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, . . .to
Controversies to which the United States shall be a party; . . ."
485 Sheive, supra note 460, at 1203. See also BREWER-CARIAS, supra note 228, at 144.
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constitutional issue unless individual litigants have the necessary standing by alleging a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy. 486
It has been a brief comparison concerning the form in which judicial review is
applied in the United States and Germany. The purpose of this comparison is to give
some basic elements for the understanding of an institution that has been of special
importance in the protection of human rights. After all, the second, and perhaps the most
frequently cited, justification for constitutional review in Europe is its protection of
fundamental rights. 487
Despite the differences in the concepts of judicial review in the United States and
Germany, and Europe in general, these models are two means to the same end, and both
fulfill the same tasks.
488 Above all, these systems of judicial review defend human rights
against violation of the individual's rights by governmental authority, particularly the
legislature.
489
B. Proposing the Creation of a National Court of Human Rights in Mexico
The widespread violation of human rights in Mexico has put the country at the
center of international attention. 490 Behind the headlines from Mexico lies a deep and
486 Sheive, supra note 460, at 1203. See also Brewer-Carias, supra note 228, at 146. See also Favoreu,
supra note 455, at 41
487 Sheive, supra note 460, at 1221
.
488 Favoreu, supra note 455, at 4 1
.
489
Id.
490 Paige Bierma, Mexico Rights Study Cites Torture, Corruption, THE San DlEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, July
25, 1996, at A 16. See also Michael C. Taylor, Why do Rule ofLaw In Mexico, 27 N.M. L. Rev. 141, 141.
See also 1995 Dep't St. .Mexico Human Rights Practices Ann. Rep. See also 1996 Dep't St.
.Mexico Human Rights Practices Ann. Rep. See also 1997 Dep't St. .Mexico Human Rights
95
complex situation that affects the life of every person in this country. 491 Major human
rights abuses include extrajudicial killings, torture, illegal arrests, and arbitrary arrests;
arbitrary interference with privacy, family, and home; and denial of fair public trial.492
Having in mind the exhaustive set of individual rights that the Mexican constitutions
contains, the gross violations of fundamental rights in Mexico can be explained only as a
failure of the existing institutions and instruments to protect these rights.
1 . General Background of the Judiciary in Mexico
The Mexican constitution has been considered as the first constitution that
emphasized economic and cultural rights as opposed to political and civil rights.
Moreover, this constitution was regarded as a revolutionary document since, as a
nationalistic constitution, it was designed to protect its citizens against foreign economic
exploitation as well as political neocolonialism.493
The Mexican Constitution of 1917 is regarded as an original, unique document,
which at the time of its promulgation was the longest constitution in the world. While
PRACTICES ANN. REP. See also Triunfo Elizalde, Comenzard Amnistia Internatcional Campana Mundial
Sobre Violacion de Derechos Humanos en Mexico., LA JORNADA, (Ciudad de Mexico) Septiembre 25,
1997, at 1. See also Anne Marie Mergier, Desde Europa, Fernando Mejia, de la FIDH: Hay una
Verdadera Degradation de la Situation de los Derechos Humanos en Mexico, REVISTA PROCESO 1091,
(Ciudad de Mexico) Septiembre 28, 1997, at Reportajes No. 06 See also Bertha Fernandez, Han Pedido
Asilo a Canada 1,189 Mexicanos, El UNIVERSAL, (Ciudad de Mexico) Octubre 15, 1997, at 2 Nacional.
Jose Carreco Figueras, Preocupa en Estados Unidos la Violencia Contra Reporteros Mexicanos, EL
Universal, (Ciudad de Mexico) Septiembre 27, 1997, at 2 Nacional. See also Pascal Beltran del Rio,
Emite la CIDH Dos Recomendaciones Contra Mexico y Prepara una Tercera por Vejaciones en Guerrero,
Chiapas y Veracruz, REVISTA PROCESO 1096, (Ciudad de Mexico) Noviembre 2, 1997, at Reprtajes No. 12.
491
Taylor, supra note 490, at 141.
492 1995 Dep't St. .Mexico Human Rights Practices Ann. Rep. See also 1996 Dep't St. .Mexico
Human Rights Practices Ann. Rep. See also 1997 Dep't St. .Mexico Human Rights Practices Ann.
Rep.
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criticized for its length and prolixity, it represented an effort to resolve the nation's ills. 494
Maybe this is the reason why some Mexican constitutional scholars have characterized
the constitution as a project to be accomplished, "a statement of revolutionary ideals that
is nominal in that there is no intended immediate congruency between its stated
aspirations and reality."495
The Mexican constitution currently in force recognizes the "division of powers"
as the cornerstone of Mexico's political organization. In the present, it is commonly
admitted that the necessary distribution of state duties among the several branches of
government suggests a mutual control among branches: a system of checks and balances
which in addition gives rise to a cooperation of the branches to act simultaneously and in
collaboration. Consequently, there is no doubt that each of the traditional branches of
government-legislative, executive, and judicial-must not be susceptible of any
subordination or dependency with respect to other branches.496
In this context the federal judiciary should play an important role because it is the
interpreter and the guardian of the whole legal order. Its mission as supreme interpreter
of the Fundamental Law draws the conclusion that the judicial branch is the branch of
government most commensurate to the observance and defense of basic human rights, as
well as to the guardianship of the constitutional system. 497
493 Constitutions That Made History (Albert P. Blaustein et al eds., 1988)
494
Id.
495 James F. Smith, Confronting Differences in the United States and the Mexican Legal Systems in the Era
ofNAFTA, 1 U.S.-Mex. L.J. 85, 94.
496 Rafael Estrada-Samano, Administration ofJustice in Mexico: What does the Future Hold?, 3 U.S.-Mex.
L.J. 35, 39. See also CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS, Third Tittle, Chapter
One. art. 49.
497 Estrada-Samano, supra note 496, at 39
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Unfortunately, in Mexico this theory is no more than that, a theory. The lack of
an authentic division of powers is deeply rooted in Mexican history as well as in the
presidential system of government, topics to be discussed no further here.498 However,
these circumstances have not only affected the administration of justice in Mexico, but
have also weakened the entire Mexican judiciary throughout its history. 499 Moreover, the
trend of constitutional reforms concerning the Federal Judicial Branch has always tended
to undermine the autonomy and public image of this power. 500
2. An Overview of the 1994 Reforms to the Mexican Judicial Branch
The undermining effect to the authority of the Federal Judiciary was not absent in
the latest 1994 constitutional reforms relating to the judicial branch in Mexico.
Congruent to the historical example of some of his predecessors, President Ernesto
Zedillo initiated the reform by dissolving the existing Supreme Court. 501 Some of the
498
Id. (Commenting how the presidential system has further degenerated into a "presidentialist" one, in
which the chief executive acts outside of constitutional bounds in the exercise of certain powers supposedly
having been conferred upon him by the political system itself, rather than by the Constitution.)
499
Id. at 40. (Citing Carranca y Rivas, Professor Emeritus at the National Autonomous University of
Mexico, who charges that Mexican presidencialism has impaired the independence of the judiciary.) See
also Taylor, supra note 490, at 144-145.
500
Taylor, supra note 490, at 144-145. (In 1928, President Plutarco Elias Calles weakened the judicial
power by discharging all the Supreme Court ministers even though they had lifetime tenure. "Following
his own precedent, President Calles instituted a series of reforms, which ignored the Constitution' s division
of powers, but much of the original intent of the 1917 constitutionalists. . . Perhaps the only twentieth-
century Mexican President who rivaled President Calles in sheer aggregated power was his successor,
Lazaro Cardenas, who eliminated the constitutional provision of lifetime tenure for Supreme Court
ministers, and replaced it with six-year terms, to run concurrent with the presidential term. . . Although the
six year terms were later re-expanded to lifetime positions in 1 944, the low opinion held for the Supreme
Court, which the 1928 and 1934 reforms established, remains to this day. A position on the Supreme Court
continues to lack the prestige, for example, of a good teaching position at a respected school in Mexico. .
•")
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Id. at 149. See also Jorge A. Vargas, The Rebirth of the Supreme Court of Mexico: An Appraisal of
President Zedillo 's Judicial Reform of 1995, 1 1 Am. U.J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 295, 297.
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main characteristics of these reforms, which affected twenty-seven constitutional articles,
are the elimination of the "floating" ministers of the Supreme Court, and the reduction of
the number of ministers from twenty-one to eleven. 502 The number of specialized Salas
was also reduced from four to two, one for administrative and labor cases, the other for
civil and penal cases. 503
Furthermore, these reforms also affected the ministers' tenure of office by
reducing it from a lifetime appointment to a fifteen-year term, without the possibility of
reappointment. 50 ' The President still retains his power to propose to the Senate the
ministers of the Supreme Court. 50: The difference now is that the President will submit to
the Senate a list of three candidates to occupy a minister's seat. 506 The Senate then has to
select one of the candidates by a super majority vote. 507 If the Senate discards all three
nominees, the President must submit another list of three different candidates. If the
Senate again rejects the list, the President at that point has the power to choose which
candidate will occupy each open ministerial seat. 508
In this set of reforms there are two that have specially captivated the public
attention and were regarded as the most original reforms of 1994. One is the creation of
502
Taylor, supra note 490, at 149. See also Vargas, supra note 501, at 302. See also IGNACIO BuRGOA,
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503 Taylor, supra note 490, at 149. See also BURGOA, supra note 502, at 882. (Formerly there were four
Salas, each for every area of specialisation: administrative, labor, civil, and penal cases. It is argued that the
reduction of the number of Salas, and the inclusion of two areas of specialization in each one will worsen
the administration of justice in Mexico because the minister of each Sala will have to decide on cases
concerning totally different areas of specialization.)
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the Consejo de la Judicatura Federal (Council of the Federal Judiciary), and the other is
the introduction of the Acciones de Inconstitucionalidad (Unconstitutional Actions)
Procedure. 509
The Consejo de la Judicatura Federal is composed of seven members: One
magistrate from the Collegiate Circuit Courts; one magistrate from the Unitary Circuit
Courts; one District Court judge; three appointees, two selected by the Senate, and the
other by the executive branch; and finally the President of the Supreme Court, who shall
also presides over the Council. 510 In general terms, this Consejo was created to expand
the administrative autonomy of the judicial branch and to free the Supreme Court from
some of its administrative obligations. 511 Some of its main functions are the
administration, vigilance, and discipline of the Federal Judicial Power, with the exception
of the Supreme Court of Justice512
The Acciones de Inconstitucionalidad (Unconstitutional Actions) Procedure is the
other significant innovation in the 1994 reforms to the Mexican judiciary. 513 This new
and "original" procedure implanted in the Constitution is important for this work at least
for two reasons. First, the introduction of these Acciones to the Constitution brought the
Erga Omnes effect into the Mexican legal system for the first time. However, this great
achievement has been greatly undermined and restricted to procedures of implementation
509
Id. at 150
510 CONSTITUCION Politica DE LOS Estados Unidos Mexicanos, Third Tittle, Chapter Four. art. 100.
See also BuRGOA, supra note 502, at 885. See also Taylor, supra note 490, at 1 50. See also Vargas, supra
note 501 , at 324-325. See also Liberalismo Contra Democracia, supra note 502, at 1930.
511 Taylor, supra note 490, at 150. See also Vargas, supra note 501, at 324. See also Liberalismo Contra
Democracia, supra note 502, at 1930.
512 CONSTITUCION Politica DE LOS Estados Unidos Mexicanos, Third Tittle, Chapter Four. art. 100.
See also Vargas, supra note 501, at 324. See also BURGOA, supra note 502, at 885. (Another important
faculty of the Consejo de la Judiciatura Federal
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that render it inapplicable. 514 Second, the Amparo trial, whose strict function is to protect
individual guarantees, was not favored at all by the introduction of the Unconstitutional
Actions Procedure, but condemned to exist under the Mariano Otero Formula. 515
Before going into details with respect to the two reasons stated above, I will
briefly describe the Acciones de Inconstitucionalidad procedure. The objective of this
procedure is to establish a contradiction between the constitutional commands and the
federal or state legislation.
516
This procedure allows the Supreme Court to strike down
unconstitutional legislation by declaring it invalid. This represents an unprecedented
event since the Supreme Court never before had been given this power. 517
To observers of the development of the Mexican legal system, the Supreme
Court's new power to make declarations with erga omnes effect certainly constitutes a
most unparalleled evolution in Mexico's constitutional history. 518 However, the
requirements for its use make the Acciones de inconstitucionalidad procedure impractical
for two reasons. Firstly, in order to use the procedure, a constitutional challenge must be
raised within thirty days of the law's publication. 519 This requirement has been regarded
as illogical due to the fact that it may take months or even years before a statute's
constitutional flaws become manifest. 520 Additionally, thirty days is such a short period
513 Vargas, supra note 50 1 , at 3 1 3. See also Taylor, supra note 490, at 1 50.
514 BURGOA, supra note 502, at 888. See also Taylor, supra note 490, at 151.
515 Vargas, supra note 501, at 314. See also supra p. 47 and note 252. (Concerning the effects of the
Mariano Otero Formula on the Mexican legal system.)
516 BURGOA, supra note 502, at 888.
517
Taylor, supra note 490, at 151.
518 Vargas, supra note 501, at 322.
519 Constitucion Politica DE LOS Estados Unidos Mexicanos, Third Tittle, Chapter Four. art. 105,
sec. II. See also Taylor, supra note 490, at 151 & 163.
520
Taylor, supra note 490, at 1 5 1 & 163.
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of time that it may make the Supreme Court unlikely to obtain enough evidence on the
practical ramifications of the challenged legislation. 521
Secondly, the challenge must be raised by either the Attorney General or by 33%
of either house of Congress. 52 ' Since legislation is not approved without presidential
support and the General Attorney is a presidential appointee who can be relieved of office
by the president at will, it is unlikely that the General Attorney will ever raise a
constitutional complaint against legislation. 52 Congress may be more likely to raise a
constitutional challenge; however, the constitutionality of a statute should not depend
upon the legislative support which a challenge generates. 524 In addition, obtaining a 33%
vote in opposition to a majority-supported law is difficult in a scheme where the number
of ruling-party Federal legislators is greater than the number of all other parties'
legislators in Congress. 525
The final consideration regarding the 1994 constitutional reforms is given to the
"super qualified majority" requirement involving the Supreme Court decision in the
Acciones de Inconstitucionalidad procedure. 526 According to this requirement the
Supreme Court may declare a law unconstitutional only if a majority of eight ministers
out of eleven decides to do so. 52 This means that in spite of the opinion of either the
General Attorney or Congress who challenged the constitutionality of said law, and
521
Id.
522
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despite the Supreme Court's simple majority vote (six or seven votes out of eleven)
against that law, it will remain effective and legally enforceable. 528
This overview of the 1994 reforms to the Mexican constitution is by no means
exhaustive. By having done this, I intend to clarify the view that the 1994 reforms are not
a great leap forward in the autonomy and power of the Judiciary. Moreover, I consider it
important to establish that the creation of new procedures under the current Mexican legal
system is always accompanied by obstacles and tricks that render them unreachable.
Weak procedures, such as the Acetones de Inconstitucionalidad, stress only the necessity
for more deep thinking about new institutions and safeguards to truly protect human
rights and the constitutional order in Mexico.
3. Acciones de Inconstitucionalidad, and the Amparo Trial
Some suggest that the implementation of the Acciones de Inconstitucionalidad
procedure in Mexico is an influence from some European countries, Germany among
them. 529 I think it is evident that the German concept of Abstract Judicial Review530
strongly influenced the Mexican Acciones de Inconstitutcionalidad procedure. It is
enough to compare Article 93(l)2of the German Basic Law with Article 105 sec. II of the
Mexican Constitution to establish this influence.
527 Constitucion Politica DE LOS Estados Unidos Mexicanos, Third Tittle, Chapter Four. art. 105,
sec. II . See also Vargas, supra note 501 , at 3 1 5.
528 Vargas, supra note 50 1 , at 3 1 5.
529
Id. at 3 14.
530 See supra p. 59 and note 3 1 5.
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Article 93(1)2 of the Basic Law provides that "the Federal
Constitutional Court decides: . . in cases of differences of opinion or
doubts on the formal and material compatibility ofFederal law or Land
law with this Basic Law, or on the compatibility ofLand law with other
Federal law, at the request of the Federal government, of a Land
government or ofone-third ofthe Bundestag members. . . "$31
Article 105, sec. II (a)(b)(c) establishes that "the Supreme Court of
Justice of the Nation shall know about. . .the Acciones de
Inconstitucionalidad, (which) shall have as their objective to establish a
contradiction between an ordinary law and this constitution. The
Acciones de Inconstitucionalidad shall be excised by. . .the 33% of the
house of representatives. . . the 33% of the Senate. . .the General
Attorney. . . "532
However, the Acciones de Inconstitutcionalidad procedure or, in other words, the
new Mexican Abstract Judicial Review, does not seem to have brought about any real or
tangible improvement to the undermined power of the Mexican Federal Judiciary. 533 It
could be that by introducing the Acciones de Inconstitutcionalidad procedure, the end to
be accomplished is merely to make apparent a new kind of federalism in Mexico. 534 But
even to this end, the procedure is highly guarded against its use. 53: Even though some
may argue that the Acciones de Inconstitutcionalidad procedure was set up to protect the
Mexican constitutional order as a whole, including the individual's rights, the
accessibility to this recourse and the existence of the Amparo trial oppose this
assumption.
As already mentioned, the only ones entitled to bring an accion de
inconstitutionalidad before the Supreme Court are either Congress or the General
Attorney. In legal terms, congressmen represent the interests of the population within the
531
F.R.G. CONST, art. 93(1)2
532 Constitucion Politica DE LOS Estados Unidos Mexicanos, Third Tittle, Chapter Four. art. 105,
sec. II(a)(b)(c).
533 BURGOA, supra note 502, at 888.
534 Vargas, supra note 501 , at 3 1
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government structure, 536 but practically speaking there, there is a huge gap between them
and the population. Generally, Mexican congressmen hardly ever bring a public claim
before Congress. Thus, it is unthinkable that congressmen will bring a single individual
complaint concerning the unconstitutionality of a law violating human rights to discuss it
in Congress.
In addition, the thirty-day period to install such procedure makes it even harder to
think that the Accionen de Inconstitutionalidad procedure was designed to be used by
individuals to protect their human rights. First, individuals need to become aware that a
given law affects their rights in any way. Second, they will have to gather sufficient
evidence in order to convince Congress that such law violates their rights. Third,
Congress will need to consider first the individuals' claim and then discuss the
incompatibility of this law with the Constitution. Are thirty days enough time to go
through such a time-consuming process? Moreover, will Congress be enthusiastic about
questioning the constitutionality of a law which it just approved some days ago?
The same happens with regard to the General Attorney's capacity to bring about
the Accion de Inconstitutionalidad procedure against laws that violate constitutional
human rights provisions. As a presidential appointee whose removal depends on the
President's will, the General Attorney is totally unlikely to employ such procedure
against a law that was approved with the presidential support. Furthermore, it is
particularly surprising that now the General Attorney be embodied as the guardian of the
535 See supra pp. 86-87.
536 Constitucion Politica DE LOS Estados Unidos Mexicanos, Third Tittle, Chapter One. arts. 51, 52.
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Constitution while this institution itself is frequently charged with a high standard of
human rights violations. 537
According to this, individuals in Mexico do not have any other legal resource to
protect their human rights but the Amparo trial, whose characteristics have already been
discussed in this work. 538 I will only make some further considerations with regard to this
extensive institution, whose particular and general objectives are respectively to protect
the individual guarantees, and to control the constitutionality of acts of the authority. 539
The Amparo works mainly to protect individual guarantees and is considered the
last bastion of the administration of justice in Mexico. 540 In addition, although the
Mexican constitution was one of the first ones to recognize social rights, the Amparo
does not protect them. 541 Moreover, the decisions resulting from Amaparo suits do not
bear the erga omnes effect but rather are limited to ordering only that the law impugned
537 Paige Bierma, Mexico Rights Study Cites Torture, Corruption, THE SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, July
25, 1996. (After a ten day visit to Chiapas, Gerrero, Tijuana, and Mexico City, an Organisation of
American States' human rights commission concluded that inefficiency, corruption, arbitrary arrests, and
torture are among the worst human rights violations in Mexico.) See also Raul Monge, Ddesarticulada y
Corrempida, la Procuraduria de Justicia es un mero Apendice de Gobernacion y el DDF: Romero Apis,
REVISTA PROCESO 1096, (Ciudad de Mexico) Noviembre 02, 1997, at Reportajes No. 10. See also Triunfo
Elizalde, Comenzard Amnistia International Campaha Mundial Sobre Violacion de Derechos Humanos
en Mexico., La Jornada, (Ciudad de Mexico) Septiembre 25, 1997, at 1. See also Miguel Cabildo, Crisis
de Derechos Humanos, Erosion Institutcional y Barbarie en Mexico, Denuncias de Amnistia que Zedillo se
Nego a Escuchar,. REVISTA PROCESO 1091, (Ciudad de Mexico) Septiembre 28, 1997, at Reportajes No.
04. See also 1995 Dep't St. .Mexico Human Rights Practices Ann. Rep. See also 1996 Dep't St.
.Mexico Human Rights Practices Ann. Rep. See also 1997 Dep't St. .Mexico Human Rights
Practices Ann. Rep.
538 See supra pp. 46-53
539 Estrada-Samano, supra note 496, at 43.
540 Camargo, supra note 3 12, at 414.
541 Jesus Aranda, Urge Amparo Social Contra Acaparadores y Monopolios, Dice el Ministro Castro,
Periodico la Jornada, (Ciudad de Mexico) Noviembre 25, 1997, at 1.
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not be applied against the claimant. 542 The law impugned will remain applicable since the
Federal Judicial Branch does not have powers to abrogate or derogate a law. 543
This fact carries a double effect: First, the Amparo does not nullify the law
deemed contrary to the constitution; it merely nullifies the single act of the authority in
the specific case brought before the Court, the law continues in force although it violates
the human rights of other people. Second, although the Amparo does not fully protect
human rights, it still goes further and limits the Supreme Court's scope of action. As a
result of the limited legal effect of the Amparo, the Court finds itself bound by this
instrument because the Amparo was designed precisely in the tradition of Roman Law,
which restrains judges from declaring laws null. 544 This notion excludes the judiciary
from nullifying legislative or executive acts in order to avoid any friction between any of
these branches. 545
In this regard, the Supreme Court cannot fully secure rights that the constitution
grants to the people. The questions then become who will secure all the rights that the
constitution gives to people in Mexico? and also who will have the power to nullify with
erga omnes effect unconstitutional laws that violate human rights? In response to these
questions, I propose the creation of a Court of Human Rights in Mexico. This specialized
court would have the power of securing the basic rights of individuals, and, at the same
time, it would have the power to invalidate legislative or executive acts on the grounds of
unconstitutionality.
542 Estrada-Samano, supra note 496, at 43. See also Camargo, supra note 3 12, at 417.
543 Camargo, supra note 3 1 2, at 42 1
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4. Why a National Court of Human Rights in Mexico?
The factual necessity of having in Mexico an organ capable to fully serving the
individual guarantees that exist under the Mexican Constitution has already been settled.
In addition to this important fact, there is another that especially calls my attention: the
Mexican Federal Judicial Power faces probably its worst crisis since it was instituted as
one of the three powers of the Union.
According to the United Nations Program for Development, the Judiciary enjoys
credibility in only 22% of Mexican society. 546 This problem is greatly related to the
dependent character of this branch in relation to the Executive Branch. The increasing
percentage of human rights violations and the restricted capacity of the judiciary to
protect those rights make the problem even more difficult to resolve.
Therefore, the creation of a National Court of Human Rights in Mexico is of
contemporaneous importance mainly because of three reasons. First, the Mexican
Judicial Power is incapable of successfully protecting individual guarantees under the
current circumstances and with the existing legal instruments. Second, although there is a
National Commission of Human Rights in Mexico, it is a mere governmental agency
whose only reason for existence is to try to better the already undermined image of the
federal government. In fact, this Commission does not deserve even to be considered as a
remote source of human rights protection. Third, people view both the judiciary and the
National Commission of Human Rights as incompetent and corrupt, and equate them
546 David Ponte, PNUD: la confianza en lajusticia mexicana, de las mas bajas, La JORNADA, (Ciudad de
Mexico) Octubre, 9, 1997, at 1 (Showing that Mexican public's confidence in the Mexican judiciary is one
of the lowest in the world.)
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with the corrupt government and the ruling party. Therefore, if the task of constitutional
protection of human rights is delegated to the current judiciary in the form of a
specialized Sala, the public will question its legitimacy and capacity to protect such
rights.
A new and specialized National Court of Human Rights could secure public
reliance on the full interpretation and protection of individual's rights. This Court could
be the final interpreter of the individual guarantees that the Mexican Constitution grants
to the people. The Mexicans would finally have a specialized Court to secure their rights
against the acts of any branch of the government, and even against acts of other
individuals.
In addition, this Court would give people in Mexico the ability to control their
elected officials, who sometimes have incentives to manipulate human rights to assure
permanence in power. Mexico is a true example of this; the current ruling party, P.R.I.,
has held power for more than 75 years. This situation has generated an era of
unprecedented human rights violations.
5. Characteristics of the Proposed National Court of Human Rights in Mexico (General
Features)
The National Court of Human Rights could be a specialized court embodied with
the power to invalidate legislative or executive acts on the grounds of incompatibility
with constitutional human rights. This power of judicial review would be like the power
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of judicial review that the American and German Courts enjoy, 547 that is, judicial review
with general effect or erga omnes.
As a specialized Court, the National Court of Human Rights would be expressly
created by a provision in the Mexican constitution, which would establish the
independence of this Court from the ordinary judiciary. This provision could be inserted
within Article 1 of the Mexican constitution, which dictates that any person in Mexico
"shall enjoy the guarantees granted by the Constitution."548 Including the creation of this
Court in this Article would serve a double purpose: First, it would stress the character of
the Court as guardian of those "guarantees granted by the constitution"; and second, it
would clearly establish the independence of this Court from the ordinary judiciary.
Since the National Court of Human Rights would be a specialized court dealing
with the protection of human rights, it would adopt the model of concentrated judicial
review. It would have the exclusive power to decide whether a government act
contravenes one of the individual guarantees in the constitution. Thus, ordinary courts
would be required to refer to this Court any case in which a human right could be
infringed, and subsequently they would be bound by the rulings of this court.
In deciding whether it is more convenient for Mexico to adopt decentralized or
centralized judicial review, I would keep in mind that Mexico is a civil-law country and
then follow the German example. 549 Mexico and Germany are both civil law countries.
The European experience shows that the American system of diffuse judicial review does
not fit in civil-law countries because unlike the unitary U.S. system, which is supervised
547 CAPPELLETTI, supra note 453, at 56, 85-86. See also BREWER-CARIAS, supra note 228, at 213-214.
548 Constitucion Politica DE LOS Estados Unidos Mexicanos, First Tittle, Chapter One. art. 1.
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by the U.S. Supreme Court, European judicial systems commonly contain more than one
higher court. 550
The National Court of Human Rights would exercise both concrete and abstract
judicial review. Abstract judicial review regarding the protection of human rights would
exist under different conditions from those under which the current Mexican abstract
judicial review was established. First, it could be requested by a person whose rights are
directly affected by a law and not merely by its application. Particularities would be
settled in the respective regulatory law. Second, keeping in mind that it can take "years
or even decades"551 before a law's violation of constitutional values become clear, the
period to challenge a law would be open to a reasonable period of time.
This Court would also exercise concrete judicial review in the context of
adversarial lawsuits in which parties would have standing to bring a complaint. That is,
concrete judicial review would be incidental to ordinary litigation. Conditions in which
parties to a case would be given standing should be established either by jurisprudence of
the court or by a special regulatory law.
Review of a given case by this Court would not be subjected to judicial discretion
such as certiorary. In contrast to the judicial discretion enjoyed by the United States
Supreme Court to grant review only when there are special and important reasons, I
would propose that the National Court of Human Rights had the obligation to review all
human rights cases brought before it. In this way, Mexican people could have an
homogeneous standard of protection of constitutional rights in which rely.
549 See supra pp. 72-73
550 Sheive, supra note 460, at 1204.
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Yet the last consideration would be whether the National Court of Human Rights
would exercise prior or posteriory abstract judicial review of laws violating human rights.
In this regard I would suggest bestowing this Court with the power to review laws only
after their promulgation.
Taylor, supra note 490, at 163.
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Conclusion
As seen in the first chapter of this work, the rights enumerated in the U.S.
constitution, in the German Basic Law, and in the Mexican constitution are quite similar.
By the time of their promulgation, these three constitutions included values and
characteristics that made them prototypes for the constitutions of other countries.
There is no doubt that the founding fathers of each of these bodies of law were
aware of the important role that these rights play in any society. Therefore, human rights
are among those important values that characterized these three constitutions. However,
the mere inclusion of human rights in any constitution does not guarantee the government
commitment to protect them.
The protection of these rights evolved differently in the United States, Germany,
and Mexico. As already mentioned, Germany and the United States faced gross
violations of fundamental rights in their very own territory at some point in history.
Since then, these nations have taken steps to successfully secure and protect individuals
against human rights violations by government.
Mexico is presently going through such widespread transformations that securing
individual rights must be one of the principal priorities. The Mexican constitution
contains high standards of protection for human rights. However, violations of human
rights in Mexico range from deficient administration of justice to forced disappearances
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and summary executions. The current judiciary, the Amaparo suit, and the Acciones de
Inconstitucionalidad have proven to lack sufficient power to stop this situation.
Reforms to the Mexican judiciary come and go without having a real impact with
regard to the protection of human rights. The Mexican judiciary is a nullity in the federal
schema. Dishonor, corruption, and executive presence inside its organs impair it from
exercising the power it has never even tried to exercise. People do not and will not ever
trust a judiciary which has refused to afford justice to nationals tragically victimized by
government; a judiciary that following the instructions of the executive has remained
silent and apart from affording a solution to the rampant human rights crisis.
Furthermore, although the Amparo is regarded as an evolving institution and the
last bastion in the Mexican administration ofjustice, the truth is that its limited effect has
been criticized by international and national legal scholars. The Amparo does not afford
full protection of human rights because it lacks erga omnes effect, which has been
regarded by many as an implicit weakness of this institution. In addition to its limited
effect, its complex structure and requirements make this institution an impractical tool for
people without legal knowledge and with scarce economic resources.
Unfortunately, the creation of the National Commission of Human Rights in
Mexico did not bring a substantial change. Born under the auspices of the executive
power, the Commission was stigmatized as another government attempt only to appear to
protect of human rights. Again, reforms tried to better the character and credibility of this
organ but its performance has always been viewed with skepticism.
Many constitutional reforms have affected the judiciary, and some of them have
been concerned with the establishment of specialized Salas to deal with special fields of
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law. However, none of these reforms has considered the creation of a specialized Sola to
protect human rights. Unfortunately, under the current situation of the Mexican judiciary,
the creation of such Solas will be meaningless.
Under these circumstances the arrival of a new National Court of Human Right
will do more than just establish an institution to protect human rights. It could better the
whole legal system because of its character as a guardian of constitutional fundamental
rights. By having a parallel check, the federal judiciary will be forced to act according to
the situation and to regain authority in the federal order. The current judiciary could not
ignore any more the constitutional mandates, at least in the context of human rights, and
it could then function as a real check upon other branches of government.
The creation of a National Court of Human Right in Mexico is a reachable
objective whose consequences are by no means negative to the Mexican society.
Throughout Mexican history, government has always talked about its sincere concern for
protecting the human rights that the constitution grants. However, throughout history,
reality has proven to be different.
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